Eventual consistency in AWS’s Identity & Access Management (IAM) service is a well-documented phenomenon. In short, when IAM changes are made in AWS, those changes actually take a few seconds to propagate through AWS’s internal system. Within this propagation window, an attacker-controlled identity with the right starting permissions could theoreti...

Privileged access abuse is behind most major cloud breaches. And it’s not always a sophisticated attacker – sometimes it’s a misconfigured service account that nobody reviewed in two years, or an IAM role inherited from an acquisition that was never cleaned up. The access was sitting there ungoverned and waiting.

That’s exactly the problem cloud privilege...

AI agents are no longer experimental. They’re running production workloads, calling APIs, querying databases, provisioning infrastructure, and making decisions across cloud environments. Ironically these agents often end up with more access than the developers who built them. They operate with real credentials, real permissions, and real consequences when something goes wrong...

As March 2026 comes to a close, the newest AWS permissions reflect expansion across three distinct domains: customer engagement, AI-driven DevOps automation, and core database infrastructure. The volume is modest, but the risk profile is not.

The central theme for March is “Silent Degradation.” Each of these permissions shares a common characteristic: the damage the...

Most teams govern AI workloads at the application layer. They configure guardrails for their Bedrock agents, scope IAM roles per workload, and build policies around approved models. That discipline matters, but it breaks down the moment a developer spins up a new account or invokes a model directly without touching the application stack.

Org-level enforcement closes...