Warranties in technology agreements can be a crucial component of a technology transaction. They provide a level of protection for both the service provider and the customer, ensuring that the services being provided meet certain standards and that any issues that may arise will be addressed in a timely and satisfactory manner.

There are two main types of warranties that are typically included in technology services agreements: express warranties and implied warranties. Express warranties are those that are explicitly stated in the agreement, while implied warranties are those that are assumed to be in place even if they are not explicitly stated.

Express warranties can include things like a guarantee that the services provided will meet certain performance standards or that certain features will be available. For example, a service provider may include a warranty that their software will have a certain uptime percentage or that their hardware will be free from defects.

Implied warranties, on the other hand, are more general and are assumed to be in place even if they are not explicitly stated. These can include things like a warranty of merchantability (meaning that the services will do what they purport to do) and a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (meaning that the services provided will meet the specific needs of the customer).

It’s important to note that warranties can be given limitations. A service provider may disclaim implied warranties. Warranties may have time limits, meaning that they will only be in effect for a certain period of time after the services are provided. And a contract can provide that certain remedies (e.g., repair or replacement) serve as the exclusive remedy for the breach of a warranty.

Warranties are an important aspect of technology services agreements and provide a level of protection for both the service provider and the customer. Knowing the types of warranties that are typically included and understanding the scope of the warranties and any limitations or exclusions that may apply is crucial when reviewing and signing a technology services agreement.

See also: Working without a signed contract – a good idea for vendors?

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

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When it comes to protecting your creative work, one question that often comes up is whether you need to register your copyright. The short answer is that you don’t have to, but it’s generally a good idea to do so.

As soon as you create a work and fix it in a tangible form, such as by writing it down or recording it, you automatically have copyright protection. This means that you have exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display your work, and to create derivative works based on it. However, simply having copyright protection doesn’t necessarily give you the tools you need to enforce it.

That’s where copyright registration comes in. By registering your work with the Copyright Office in the United States (or a similar organization in other countries), you gain several important benefits. One of the most significant is the ability to sue for infringement in federal court. If someone is using your work without your permission and you haven’t registered your copyright, the court will not hear your case. But if you have registered your copyright within a certain time period, you can pursue your case and, also seek statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. These can be substantial, even if you can’t prove that you actually suffered any damages.

Another benefit of registration is that it can be used as evidence of the validity of your copyright in court. For example, if someone is accused of infringing your copyright and they claim that your work is not original or that you don’t own the rights to it, having a registration certificate can help to prove that your work is valid and that you are the rightful copyright holder.

In summary, while copyright registration is not mandatory, it’s a good idea to register your work because it provides a means to enforce the rights of copyright holders if someone is using it without permission and also can be used as evidence in court if any infringement claim arises.

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

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Twitter has been in the news lately for what some seem to imply has been a problematic termination of third-party developers from its platform. This is a good occasion to talk about API access agreements in general, what they should cover, and why they are important.

An API (Application Programming Interface) access agreement is a legal document that outlines the terms and conditions under which a third-party developer can access and use an API. These agreements are important because they ensure that the API owner maintains control over their system and that the third-party developer understands and agrees to the terms and conditions of use.

System security and stability

One of the key provisions in an API access agreement relates to security. As APIs are used to access sensitive data and perform critical functions, it is essential that the API is protected from unauthorized access and misuse. The API owner should set strict security requirements for the third-party developer, such as data encryption and authentication protocols, to ensure that the API is used in a secure manner. The API owner may also wish to set limits on how often calls can be made to the API, so that the system is not overloaded or otherwise subject to diminished performance.

Intellectual property protection

Another key provision in an API access agreement relates to copyright. The API owner should have the right to control the use of their API, including the right to limit the third-party developer’s use of the API as needed to protect intellectual property rights. The API owner should also ensure that the third-party developer agrees not to copy, distribute, or otherwise use the API in a manner that is outside of an agreed scope.

These are contracts

API access agreements are contracts, and as such, they are legally binding. The API owner must be able to maintain control of its system for the system to function properly. This means that the API owner should have the right to revoke access to the API if the third-party developer breaches the terms of the agreement or if the API is being used in a manner that is not in compliance with the agreement.

Avoiding problems with termination

When terminating access to an API, the provider can treat a third-party developer fairly by providing adequate notice and a clear explanation for the termination. The developer should also negotiate for a reasonable amount of time to transition to an alternative solution or to retrieve any data it has stored within the API. Additionally, the provider may wish to make a good faith effort to assist the developer in finding a suitable alternative solution. If the termination is due to a breach of the API access agreement, the provider may provide the developer with specific details about the breach and allow for an opportunity for the developer to cure the breach before terminating access. A developer should also consider trying to negotiate a provision that says it is entitled to compensation from the developer for any losses or damages incurred as a result of an improper termination. Overall, the provider should approach the termination process in a fair, transparent and reasonable manner, taking into account the developer’s business needs and interest.

API access agreements are an essential part of the API ecosystem. They help ensure that the API owner maintains control over its system, that the third-party developer understands and agrees to the terms and conditions of use, and that the API is used in a secure and compliant manner. It is important that the parties understand the key provisions in an API access agreement and seek to comply with them in order to use the API successfully.

See also: Court will not aid company that was banned from accessing Facebook API

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

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Limitations of liability are an important aspect of any technology agreement, as they help to define and limit the amount of financial responsibility that each party in the agreement must accept in the event of a dispute or legal action.

Caps

One of the main limitations of liability in a technology agreement is the cap on the amount damages. This means that even if a party is found to be at fault in a dispute, the maximum amount of financial responsibility that it is willing to accept is limited to a specific dollar amount. For example, a technology company may agree to a cap on damages of $1 million in the event of a legal dispute. Or it could agree that the maximum amount it would have to pay would be whatever its insurance will cover. It is important to note that while damages caps can provide predictability and stability in terms of financial exposure, they can also limit the recovery of a party that has suffered significant losses. So they should be negotiated thoughtfully.

Exclusions

Another limitation of liability in a technology agreement is the exclusion of certain types of damages. This means that even if a party is found to be at fault, they are not responsible for certain types of losses or damages. For example, a technology company may exclude consequential damages, such as lost profits or loss of business, in the event of a legal dispute.

Carveouts

Though a limitation of liability provision may call for a damages cap or an exclusion of the types of damages available, parties recognize that in certain situations, damages  should not be limited. For example, a breach of confidentiality by one party may be particularly harmful to the other party, and thus it would be unfair to cap the amount of damages. Another example arises in the context of indemnification. If one party is obligated to pick up the tab because the other party got sued for what the indemnifying party did, then the indemnified party will want to make sure it is made whole, regardless of what the damages are. In situations such as these, the parties may negotiate a “carveout” from the damages cap or exclusion, and agree that if something occurs within a defined set of circumstances, the liability caps or exclusions will not apply.

Limitations on limitations

It is important to keep in mind that limitations of liability are subject to legal interpretation and may not be enforceable in all jurisdictions. They can be evaluated and interpreted by courts in different ways. Additionally, some courts may hold that a limitation of liability clause is unenforceable if it is found to be unconscionable or against public policy.

Tough negotiation

In many technology transactions, the limitation of liability provision is among the last remaining issues to negotiate. This fact underscores how important such provisions are in making a particular transaction palatable to a party. A particular vendor may not be willing to “bet the company” on a particular deal (i.e., would not want to risk everything if something goes wrong). So these sorts of provisions are useful in giving parties comfort to enter into a deal.

Evan Brown is a technology attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter: @internetcases

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A federal court in Wisconsin allowed a cryptocurrency scam victim to try to find out who stole his cryptocurrency. It found that good cause existed to allow the plaintiff-victim to send subpoenas to Coinbase, Binance and Gemini.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a party cannot seek discovery “from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).” So plaintiff was required to get authorization from the court before seeking information from the various cryptocurrency exchange platforms onto which he believed his assets had been placed. He filed a motion requesting such authorization.

The judge first observed that various trial courts within the same federal circuit (this case arose in Wisconsin federal court, which is in the Seventh Circuit) have applied different tests when deciding whether “expedited discovery” is appropriate. One such test requires, among other things, that the party seeking discovery show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the request is not granted. The other test – the good cause standard – allows expedited discovery “when the need for [such discovery], in consideration with the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.”

In this case, the court applied the good cause standard. But the court did not allow plaintiff to send subpoenas concerning all of the information he had asserted should be discoverable. For example, plaintiff asked the court for permission to seek the Doe defendant’s social security number, as well as transaction logs and correspondence. The court found such requests “go far beyond seeking the defendants’ identifying information” and would instead be the types of discovery requests the court might expect plaintiff to make once the defendants have been identified and plaintiff is seeking discovery as to his substantive allegations. Instead, the court permitted expedited discovery for the sole purpose of obtaining information to identify the John Doe defendants. This information included only the name, street address, telephone number and e-mail address of each John Doe.

The court further ordered that Coinbase, Binance and Gemini had to provide a copy of the subpoena to each John Doe and any other affected user as soon as possible after service of the subpoena. The court’s order also provided that each of the platforms and any affected user must have 14 days from the date of service of the subpoena to object to the subpoena under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2)(B). The platforms were ordered not to disclose any John Doe’s identifying information, or such information for any other affected user, during that fourteen-day period (unless or until the court may otherwise order). The platforms were also ordered to preserve any material responsive to the subpoena for a period of no less than 90 days to allow the plaintiff to file a motion to compel.

Wuluvarana v. Does 1-3, 2023 WL 183874 (E.D. Wisconsin, January 14, 2023)

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

See also:

• Court allows blockchain platform to send subpoena seeking info about hacker
• Exploiting blockchain software defect supports unjust enrichment claim
• The trademark and right of publicity woes of having a cryptocurrency named after you
• Tomcar sales using Bitcoin reveal some new norms

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An audit provision in a technology contract is a clause that allows for one party to inspect and perhaps copy certain business records and other information of the other party. Often an audit provision authorizes a party that owns licensed technology or software (the provider or licensor) to periodically inspect and audit the customer’s use of the technology or software. These types of provisions help ensure that the customer is using the technology or software in accordance with the terms of the agreement and that it is not infringing or otherwise misusing the technology or software. They can also be used to ensure that the is paying the appropriate license fees or royalties.

One often sees audit provisions in reseller agreements and revenue sharing agreements, to give the right of one party to inspect records that confirm it is being paid in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Since commissions are often calculated as a percentage of revenue, a referral partner may want to see the underlying records supporting the amounts the referral partner is being paid.

The audit provision typically outlines the procedures for the audit, such as the frequency of the audits (often expressed as “no more often than x times per calendar year”), who may conduct the audits (e.g., designees of the auditing party), and what information must be made available for review during the audit. It may also outline the rights and responsibilities of both parties during the audit process, including any limitations on the scope of the audit and the handling of any confidential information that is revealed during the audit.

An audit provision in a technology contract may provide that if the audit uncovers underpayment by the audited party (perhaps by at least a certain percentage) then audited party will be responsible not only for the amount of the underpayment, but also for the costs incurred by the auditing party in conducting the audit.

Overall, audit provisions are an important aspect of technology agreements and play a vital role in protecting the interests of both parties involved. It is important for both parties to understand the audit provisions in the agreement and to comply with them fully in order to avoid any potential legal disputes.

See also: “Right to audit” provisions in technology services agreements can benefit both parties

Evan Brown is a Chicago attorney helping businesses negotiate and draft technology services and development contracts. He also handles many other issues involving the internet, copyright and trademarks, domain names and new media. Call him at (630) 362-7237 or email ebrown@internetcases.com. Follow him on Twitter: @internetcases

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Indemnification provisions in technology agreements play a crucial role in protecting the parties involved in a technology-related contract. These provisions are often included in agreements among technology vendors, customers, software developers, and other related parties to shift the risk of losses and legal liabilities from one party to another.

Picking up the tab

Indemnification is a legal concept that involves one party (the indemnitor) agreeing to compensate the other party (the indemnitee) for any losses or damages that may occur as a result of a specific event or occurrence. Similarly, a provision of this sorty may provide that one party will “defend” the other party by retaining counsel and paying the costs of defense in court, as those costs are incurred. In technology agreements, indemnification provisions are often used to shift the risk of losses or damages that may result from a party’s breach of contract or negligence. Customers will often seek to insist that the vendor indemnify the customer in the event a third party files a lawsuit against the customer because the technology infringes that third party’s intellectual property rights.

The main purpose of indemnification provisions in technology agreements is to protect the parties involved from potential financial losses, legal liabilities, and other costs associated with legal disputes. For example, a contract may provide that if a software developer breaches a contract and causes a loss to the client, the indemnification provision would require the developer to compensate the client for any damages.

Key elements

Indemnification provisions in technology agreements typically contain several key elements, including the types of losses or damages that will be covered, the parties that are responsible for indemnifying the other party, and the time frame for indemnification to take place. It also often covers the notification requirements, the documentation and information that should be provided in case of losses or damages, and the limitation of liability.

Another key aspect of indemnification provisions is that they are often mutual, meaning that both parties are responsible for indemnifying each other in certain situations. This can help to ensure that both parties are protected in the event of a legal dispute, and it also helps to create a balance of risk between the parties.

Why bother?

Indemnification provisions in technology agreements play a vital role in protecting the parties involved from financial losses, legal liabilities, and other costs associated with legal disputes. It’s important for both parties to understand the concept of indemnification, the purpose of these provisions, and how they are typically used in technology agreements.

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

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In a recent trademark infringement case, the court considered whether Instagram users tagging photos of one product with the account of another company’s product was evidence of actual confusion. In this case, the court found that it was not evidence of actual confusion.

Plaintiff makes premium tequila sold in bottles and defendant makes inexpensive tequila-soda product sold in cans. Plaintiff sued defendant for trademark infringement and sought a preliminary injunction against defendant. To support its assertion that it was likely to succeed on the merits of the case, plaintiff argued there was actual confusion among the consuming public. For example, on Instagram, at least 30 people had tagged photos of plaintiff’s products with defendant’s account.

The court found that in these circumstances, particularly where a marketing survey also showed less than 10% of people were confused by the defendant’s mark, that the incorrect tagging did not show actual confusion.

Though the bar for showing actual confusion is low, the court noted that a showing of confusion requires more than a “fleeting mix-up of names” and that confusion must be caused by the trademark used and must “sway” consumer purchase.

In this case, the court found that defendant’s evidence regarding mistaken Instagram tags did not establish a likelihood of trademark confusion that would result in purchase decisions based on the mistaken belief that the defendant’s tequila-soda product was affiliated with the plaintiff. At best, in the court’s view, the plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated a “fleeting mix-up of names,” which was not evidence of actual confusion.

The court likened this case to the recent case of Reply All Corp. v. Gimlet Media, LLC, 843 F. App’x 392 (2d Cir. 2021), wherein “instances of general mistake or inadvertence—without more—[did] not suggest that those potential consumers in any way confused [plaintiff’s] and [defendant’s] products, let alone that there was confusion that could lead to a diversion of sales, damage to goodwill, or loss of control over reputation.”

Casa Tradición S.A. de C.V. v. Casa Azul Spirits, LLC, 2022 WL 17811396 (S.D. Texas, December 19, 2022)

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In the case of Dfinity Foundation v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the court considered whether the new logo that Meta adopted after its 2021 rebranding infringed upon Dfinity’s trademark. In the infringement litigation that Dfinity brought over the issue, Meta moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion.

Dfinity operates the Internet Computer – a public blockchain network that seeks to provide developers and entrepreneurs with a public compute platform for building websites, enterprise systems and internet services within an open environment. Key to Dfinity’s efforts are “dapps” or decentralized applications. In 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted Dfinity a registration for the following mark:

When Meta rebranded in 2021, Mark Zuckerberg indicated, among other things, that the company would work with creators and developers in a decentralized fashion. In connection with the rebranding, Meta adopted and sought registration of this logo:

Dfinity sued in federal court in California alleging, among other things, trademark infringement. It alleged that the similarities between the marks, coupled with the related services and customer bases, will cause confusion because “consumers will mistakenly believe that Meta and its services … are connected with, sponsored by, affiliated with, or related to Dfinity and the Internet Computer.”

Meta moved to dismiss. In granting the motion to dismiss, the court found that confusion between Meta’s logo and Dfinity’s logo was unlikely as a matter of law.

Similarity of the marks

Employing the “sight, sound, and meaning” test, the court found the marks were dissimilar: Dfinity’s shape was a traditional infinity sign, with the lines crossing at the horizontal and vertical midpoint, rendered in a precise multicolor format that Dfinity instructs users of the logo not to alter. In the court’s view, the Meta logo looks different – while it includes two loops and bears some resemblance to an infinity sign, the lines cross above the vertical midpoint and the two loops are squished into vertical oblong shapes. Meta did not claim color as a feature of its mark.

Relatedness of services

On the question of whether the services provided under the two marks were similar, the court remained neutral. It noted that Dfinity has targeted  developers interested in using blockchain to “build websites, enterprise systems and internet services within an open environment.” At the same time, “Meta targets everyone, including developers, some of whom presumably are interested in building their products within, or at least compatible with, such an ‘open environment.'” Meta argued that its products are antithetical to that vision, and there is no indication that it is interested in expanding into the realm occupied by Dfinity and the Internet Computer.  But the court found that given Meta’s metamorphosis over the last few years, such a move is not implausible on the pleadings, particularly in light of Zuckerberg’s statement at the launch of the Meta brand.

Sophistication of users

The court then evaluated the types of users that would encounter the Dfinity and Meta logos, and whether, given their level of sophistication, confusion would be likely. The court found that because of the high level of sophistication, it is less likely one would be confused: “That these sophisticated people, immersed in the intricacies of the tech world, would be duped by a logo, particularly one that is not similar in key respects . . . borders on implausible.”

Actual confusion

Next the court considered whether purported instances of actual confusion weighed in favor of Dfinity. In this situation, Dfinity had provided six tweets that purported to show that users were confused. But the court disagreed. First, it noted that because the tweets were in reply to a Dfinity tweet, they did not express how the users would experience an encounter with the mark “organically”. And second, the court found that the content of the tweets indicated the users actually knew the difference between the two enterprises.

Marketing channels

Having found that the parties’ services were not “totally unrelated” at this stage, the court also found that the parties’ marketing channels were similar, but that this factor did not weigh as heavily as the others previously discussed.

Meta’s intent

Though Dfinity alleged “willful and wonton disregard of Dfinity’s established and superior rights” in its trademark, it did not provide evidence of that. And given that the court found the marks to be dissimilar, the court also found that Meta’s intent did not support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Dfinity Foundation v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2022 WL 16857036 (N.D. California, November 10, 2022)

See also: Court throws out Facebook’s lawsuit against Teachbook.com

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The issues in the case of Yuksel v. Twitter were whether Twitter, by terminating plaintiff’s account (1) breached its contract with plaintiff, and (2) violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Twitter moved to dismiss the breach of contract and RICO claims. The court granted the motion because Section 230 barred the claims and because plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the claims.

The gist of plaintiff’s claims centered on allegations that Twitter suspended plaintiff’s account due to deference to the Turkish government. He claims that by being cut from his 142,000 followers and by having 7 years’ worth of “intellectual content” destroyed, he was damaged to the tune of $142 million.

Section 230 immunity

The court held that Twitter was immune from plaintiff’s claims, under 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1). That provision states that:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

If found that Twitter is a provider of an interactive computer service, and that plaintiff sought to hold Twitter liable for decisions regarding information provided by another information content provider. In this situation, that other information content provider was plaintiff himself. The court also found that plaintiff sought to treat Twitter as a publisher in connection with its decision to suspend his account. But the decision to suspend an account is within the scope of “traditional publishing functions”. Quoting the well-known case of Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009), the court noted that “removing content is something publishers do.”

Plaintiff tried to get around Section 230 immunity by asserting that his RICO claim fit into the statute’s carveout for federal criminal prosecution (Section 230 (e)(1) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute.”) The court rejected this argument, concluding that the carveout from immunity extends only to criminal prosecutions and not civil actions based on criminal statutes.

Failure to state a claim

The court held that even without Section 230 immunity, the breach of contract and RICO claims would fail. Plaintiff had alleged breach of contract in the complaint, but in responding to the motion to dismiss stated that he did not claim breach of contract between himself and Twitter, but rather asked the court to find Twitter’s terms of service unenforceable because they permit the arbitrary and reckless deletion of user accounts. The court noted that it was constrained to not look beyond the complaint to allegations plaintiff made only in response to Twitter’s motion to dismiss.

On the RICO claim, the court found that plaintiff failed to identify the “enterprise” subject to the RICO claim, nor any purported “pattern,” “racketeering activity,” or “injury” to “business or property” caused by it. Moreover, according to the court, plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Twitter was somehow in cahoots with foreign dictators failed to meet basic pleading standards in federal court.

Yuksel v. Twitter, Inc., 2022 WL 16748612 (N.D. California, November 7, 2022)

See also:

• Section 230 immunity did not protect Omegle in product liability lawsuit
• Can a person be liable for retweeting a defamatory tweet?
• Section 230 did not protect Snapchat from negligence liability in car crash lawsuit over Speed Filter

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A federal court in Delaware dismissed most of the intellectual property infringement claims concerning a competing online room-planning software tool. The court held that plaintiff’s trade dress infringement and breach of contract claims failed, and that its copyright infringement claims failed, except for those allegations relating to the copying of computer code.

No trade dress protection where look and feel was functional

On the trade dress claim, plaintiff had identified fifteen elements that formed a cohesive “look and feel” of its software. And the court found – based on extensive use, wide advertisement and appearance in industry publications – that the trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. But the court found that the look and feel was merely functional and not subject to trade dress protection.

Copyright infringement – mixed bag

Similarly, the court dismissed the copyright infringement claim regarding the selection, arrangement and coordination of visual elements of the program. In the court’s view, these elements were merely functional and thus not subject to copyright protection. The court dismissed the copyright infringement claim as well concerning the tool’s graphics. On this point the court was even more bold – it found after a visual comparison of the works that they simply were not similar.

The court allowed the copyright infringement claim concerning the program’s code to move forward. It found that plaintiff had alleged both access and similarity. Plaintiff had also alleged that defendant repeatedly accessed the program to stress test the design, and that there were extensive similarities in the tools’ mechanics. These allegations were enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Browsewrap not enough

Finally, the breach of contract claim failed, not on the basis of preemption as one might expect, but because the court found plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that a contract had been formed. Plaintiff asserted that its website’s terms of service prohibited copying of the software, and that defendant’s employees should have been aware of those terms on a browsewrap theory – there was a link to the terms at the bottom of the page. But the court would not find that plaintiff alleged enough facts to plausibly allege that  defendant’s employees manifested assent to those browsewrap terms.

Design With Friends, Inc. v. Target Corporation, 2022 WL 4448197 (D. Delaware, September 23, 2022)

See also:

• Old social media posts violated trade dress infringement injunction
• What is required for a website design to be protectible as trade dress?
• Tweet served as evidence of initial interest confusion in trade dress case

The post Company successfully defends against trade dress and copyright infringement claims over online software tool appeared first on evan.law | Evan Brown | technology and intellectual property attorney.

Strouse was the president and CEO of a company but departed with the company was sold. He did not approve of how the new company continued to use YouTube videos Strouse had made when he was with the company. So Strouse sued under Pennsylvania law for unauthorized use of his name and likeness. The company moved to dismiss the claim and the court granted the motion.

There are three elements to a claim for unauthorized use of name and likeness under Pennsylvania law:

• a natural person’s name or likeness must have commercial value;
• the accused party must make an unauthorized use of that name or likeness; and
• the use is for commercial or advertising purposes.

The court found that Strouse’s claim failed on the first and second elements.

Although he claimed he suffered substantial damages due to the company’s supposed misappropriation, the court found he offered no explanation for how or why these damages occurred. He did not allege that his name had any special reputation or prestige such that mention of his name or use of his image in a video on the company’s website could confer an actionable benefit.

And the court found that Strouse’s pleadings did not establish that the company was using the videos without authorization. Strouse had made the videos as president and CEO of the company – he certainly authorized such use then. The acquiring company purchased the business’s assets, including the videos that were made.

Wurth Baer Supply Co. v. Strouse, 2022 WL 4125802 (M.D. Pennsylvania, September 9, 2022)

See also:

• Right of publicity case against Shaquille O’Neal over a photo he tweeted and posted to Instagram moves forward.
• California court okays lawsuit against mugshot posting website
• Court denies request of plaintiffs in right of publicity suit to exhume the body of Aunt Jemima

The post Court dismisses company executive’s name and likeness lawsuit over YouTube videos appeared first on evan.law | Evan Brown | technology and intellectual property attorney.

Plaintiff was an administrative assistant at defendant company. When her supervisor got word that plaintiff had been asked to join a competing company started by some other former company employees, the supervisor allegedly logged onto plaintiff’s work computer and without authorization accessed plaintiff’s Gmail account to get more information confirming plaintiff’s plans. Plaintiff was later terminated.

So she sued under the federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) and the Federal Wiretap Act (under a part of that act often called the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)). Defendant moved to dismiss both the claims. The court denied the motion to dismiss the SCA claim but dismissed the ECPA claim.

The SCA prohibits, among other things, the intentional unauthorized access of a “facility through which an electronic communication service is provided”—thereby obtaining access to an electronic communication while in electronic storage. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). A court may award actual damages, statutory damages, and punitive damages for violation of the SCA. If a plaintiff seeks statutory damages under the SCA, it must prove actual damages. But one need not prove actual damages to recover punitive damages. The ECPA prohibits, among other things, the “interception” of electronic communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a). Courts have generally held that such “interception” must be contemporaneous with transmission.

The court held plaintiff could move forward with her SCA claim even though she had not pled actual damages. She had sufficiently pled that she should be awarded punitive damages. And the court tossed the ECPA claim because the facts as alleged showed that the email messages the employer allegedly accessed had already been delivered and therefore were not intercepted as the statute requires for liability.

Benz v. PHB Realty Co., 2022 WL 3098579 (D. Kansas, August 4, 2022)

See also:

• Employer not allowed to search for porn on employee’s home computer
• Can an LLC member violate the Stored Communications Act by accessing other members’ email?
• Employee did not violate Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by checking Facebook and personal email at work

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When plaintiff was 11 years old, she was connected to a man in his late thirties using Omegle (a “free online chat room that randomly pairs strangers from around the world for one-on-one chats”). Before the man was arrested some three years later, he forced plaintiff to send him pornographic videos of herself, made threats against her, and engaged in other inappropriate and unlawful conduct with plaintiff.

Plaintiff sued Omegle, alleging product liability and negligence relating to how Omegle was designed, and for failure to warn users of the site’s dangers. Omegle moved to dismiss these claims, claiming that it could not be liable because it was protected by 47 U.S.C. §230.

The court found that that Section 230 did not apply because plaintiff’s claims did not seek to treat Omegle as the publisher or speaker of content. The court observed that to meet the obligation plaintiff sought to impose on Omegle, Omegle would not have had to alter the content posted by its users. It would only have had to change its design and warnings.

And the court found that plaintiff’s claims did not rest on Omegle’s publication of third party content. In the same way that Snapchat did not avoid liability on the basis of Section 230 in Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021), Omegle’s alleged liability was based on its “own acts,” namely, designing and operating the service in a certain way that connected sex offenders with minors, and failed to warn of such dangers.

A.M. v. Omegle.com, LLC, 2022 WL 2713721 (D. Oregon, July 13, 2022)

See also:

• Omegle protected by Section 230 against claims for child pornography, sex trafficking and related claims

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Plaintiff set up a Google Drive so that he could collect photos and other content related to a local school board controversy. He thought it was private, but it was actually configured so that anyone using the URL could access the content. After the local controversy escalated, plaintiff’s son emailed some photos to an opponent, and one of those photos contained the Google Drive’s URL. That photo made its way into the hands of defendant, who, using the URL, allegedly reviewed, downloaded, deleted, added, reorganized, renamed, and publicly disclosed contents of the Google Drive.

So plaintiff sued under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §1030, (the “CFAA”). Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that plaintiff had failed to adequately plead that defendant’s access to the Google Drive was without authorization.

Defendant had argued that her access using the URL could not be considered unauthorized under the CFAA, in accordance with the holding of hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180 (9th Cir. 2022). In that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the prohibition on unauthorized access is properly understood to apply only to private information – information delineated as private through use of a permission requirement of some sort.” Thus, for a website to fall under CFAA protections, it must have erected “limitations on access.” And if “anyone with a browser” could access the website, it had no limitations on access.

In this case, defendant merely used her web browser and the URL she obtained to access plaintiff’s Google Drive. The portion of the Google Drive was not password protected. And plaintiff had – though inadvertently – enabled the setting that allowed anyone with the URL to access the drive’s contents.

But in the court’s view, the Google Drive nonetheless had limitations that made defendant’s access unauthorized. The court differentiated the situation from one in which just “anyone with a web browser” might access the content, for example, via a web search. One needed to enter a 68-character URL to access the content. And the content was not indexed by any search engines. So the Google Drive was not “per se” public. And defendant’s access – as plaintiff had pled it – was not authorized.

Greenburg v. Wray, 2022 WL 2176499 (D. Ariz., June 16, 2022)

See also:

• Can you violate the CFAA by deleting data on your own computer?

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Plaintiff sued a company and its president for copyright infringement, over some photos that the company published online. The individual defendant moved to dismiss the claim against him, arguing that the complaint (1) did not plead any facts concerning action that he took, (2) did not try to pierce the company’s corporate veil, and (3) contained no facts to establish that the company is the alter ego of the individual defendant. Plaintiff conceded it was neither pursuing an alter-ego theory nor seeking to pierce the corporate veil. Instead, plaintiff argued that the individual defendant was vicariously liable for the company’s infringement. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

The court looked first to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), which provides that one infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it. But then it cited to later Tenth Circuit cases (e.g., Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013)) which state the test for vicarious liability a bit differently. Under  Diversey, “[v]icarious liability attaches when the defendant ‘has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity’ and ‘has a direct financial interest in such activities.” There is no mention of declining to exercise the right to stop or limit the infringement under this test, as there is in Grokster.

The court found that the plaintiff’s claims for vicarious liability against the individual defendant survive because the complaint alleged that defendant was the owner and president of the company, had the ability to supervise and control content on the website, and received a financial benefit from the operation of the website. It rejected the individual defendant’s argument that the claim should fail because there were no allegations that he declined to exercise the right to stop or limit the infringement.

Great Bowery v. Best Little Sites, 2022 WL 2074253 (D. Utah June 9, 2022)

See also:

• Real estate brokerage may be liable for its agent’s copyright infringement
• Photographer’s copyright claim against officer of company over photos on website moves forward

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Under traditional principles of defamation law, one can be liable for repeating a defamatory statement to others. Does the same principle apply, however, on social media such as Twitter, where one can easily repeat the words of others via a retweet?

Hacking, tweet, retweet, lawsuit

A high school student hacked the server hosting the local middle school’s website, and modified plaintiff’s web page to make it appear she was seeking inappropriate relationships. Another student tweeted a picture of the modified web page, and several people retweeted that picture.

The teacher sued the retweeters for defamation and reckless infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed the case, holding that 47 USC §230 immunized defendants from liability as “users” of an interactive computer service. Plaintiff sought review with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

Who is a “user” under Section 230?

Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider”. Importantly, the statute does not define the word “user”. The lower court held that defendant retweeters fit into the category of “user” under the statute and therefore could not be liable for their retweeting, because to impose such liability would require treating them as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another.

Looking primarily at the plain language of the statute, and guided by the 2006 California case of Barrett v. Rosenthal, the state supreme court found no basis in plaintiff’s arguments that defendants were not “users” under the statute. Plaintiff had argued that “user” should be interpreted to mean libraries, colleges, computer coffee shops and others who, “at the beginning of the internet” were primary access points for people. And she also argued that because Section 230 changed common law defamation, the statute must speak directly to immunizing individual users.

The court held that it was “evident” that Section 230 abrogated the common law of defamation as applied to individual users. “That individual users are immunized from claims of defamation for retweeting content they did not create is evident from the statutory language. ”

Banaian v. Bascom, — A.3d —, 2022 WL 1482521 (N.H. May 11, 2022)

See also:

• Forwarder of defamatory email protected under Section 230

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Defendant listed a domain name for sale using DomainAgents. After a couple rounds of negotiation, plaintiff accepted defendant’s counteroffer to sell the domain name. But when the time came to put the domain name in escrow to enable transfer, defendant backed out of the deal, saying he had changed his mind. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and sought a temporary restraining order that would prohibit defendant from transferring the domain name.

The court granted the motion. It agreed with plaintiff that it was appropriate to determine the motion ex parte (that is, without giving notice to the defendant) because the defendant could transfer the domain name in the meantime, thereby depriving plaintiff of the ability to procure an irreplaceable asset.

It found plaintiff would likely succeed on the merits of the breach of contract claim, because plaintiff had shown that a valid contract likely exited, that plaintiff was willing to perform its end of the bargain, that defendant had breached by refusing to go through with the transaction, and that plaintiff had been damaged due to the loss of the ability to procure the domain name from defendant.

The court further found a likelihood of irreparable harm to plaintiff, in that defendant’s communicated belief that he was not bound by the purchase agreement indicated he would sell the domain name to another interested party. If that were to happen, plaintiff would have no recourse against that purchaser, who was not in privity of contract with plaintiff.

Moreover, the court found the balance of equities favored plaintiff. The temporary restraining order would only be in place until a further hearing on injunctive relief could be had, and defendant would not otherwise be restricted from using the domain name in the meantime.

Finally, the court held that the public interest favored granting injunctive relief. The public interest strongly favors enforcing contracts.

Jump Operations, LLC v. Merryman, 2022 WL 1082641 (D. Nev., April 8, 2022)

See also:

• When can you use a competitor’s trademark in a domain name?

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Back in the 1990s, Congress recognized that stalkers were aided in their crimes by using victims’ driver’s license information, and states were selling driver’s license information to marketers. So Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq. (the “DPPA”). This statute makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly disclose personal information from a motor vehicle record for any use other than certain uses that the statute permits.

Defendant had more than 27 million Texas driver’s license records that it stored on an external unencrypted server. In 2020, it announced that a third party had accessed the records without authorization. As expected, the class action lawyers jumped on board and sued under the DPPA.

The lower court dismissed the DPPA claim in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs sought review with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

It held that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that storing the data on an unencrypted server amounted to a “disclosure”. More specifically, although plaintiffs argued that defendants had placed the information on a server that was readily accessible to the public, that assertion was nowhere in the complaint, nor was it supported by the facts alleged in the complaint.

In finding there to be no disclosure, the court observed that the storage of the data, as alleged, did not make it visible to a digital “passer-by”. This made the case different from Senne v. Village of Palatine, Ill.,695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2012), in which a police officer disclosed information by putting a traffic ticket on a windshield, which any passer-by could see. The court also looked to Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015), in which that court held there to be no disclosure under the DPPA when someone stole an unencrypted laptop containing information protected under the statute.

Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., No. 21-20404 (5th Cir., March 11, 2022)

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Plaintiff sued YouTube after the platform took down one of plaintiff’s videos in response to a DMCA takedown notice. She claimed YouTube failed to follow the procedures in 17 U.S.C. §512 by, for example, not providing her with a physical signature of the copyright owner and otherwise not following the “exact course of the DMCA guidelines.” YouTube moved to dismiss and the court granted the motion.

It held that §512 serves to provide safe harbor protections from copyright infringement liability to platforms. Section 512 does not,  however, give rise to a standalone basis to sue a platform.

When a copyright owner sends a DMCA takedown notice to a platform, it must include substantially the following:

• A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
• Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
• Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.
• Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
• A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
• A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

If the notification does not include substantially these items, then if the platform leaves the content up, the insufficient notification will not be considered to have placed the platform on notice of the alleged infringing activity. So if the copyright holder sues the platform for copyright infringement, it will have to plead other facts showing that the platform is liable for infringement. Relatedly, if the platform acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to allegedly infringing content when it gets knowledge via a valid takedown notice, it will have an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.

In this case, the court confirmed the notion that the DMCA provides this safe harbor to the platform but does not give the person whose content has been taken down the right to sue the platform. The court does not mention – but it remains relevant – that one whose content has been taken down can seek a remedy under 17 U.S.C. §512(f) against a party who sends a takedown notice while knowingly materially misrepresenting that the content is infringing. But that is not the course plaintiff in this case took – she sued YouTube for not following the requirements that apply to copyright holders. And she lost.

Finley v. YouTube, 2022 WL 704835 (N.D. Cal., March 9, 2022)

See also: Is it defamation to accuse someone of sending a bogus DMCA takedown notice?

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