September has been a month of grim news about the German economy. Inflation, which brings back the specter of the 1920s, remains stubbornly high. The Federal Statistical Office tells us that the inflation rate, “measured as the year-on-year change in the consumer price index (CPI), stood at +6.1% in August 2023.”

It is not just the Russia-Ukraine War that is causing inflation anymore. The Financial Times reports that, even excluding food and energy, inflation remains at 5.5% with higher wage pressures making it sticky, if not structural. Inflation is affecting all industries. In construction, costs are now 38.5% higher than the pre-pandemic early 2020.

An economy in deep crisis

New orders for construction companies have dried up. Note that these orders are canaries in the coal mine and indicate confidence in the future. They are a forward-looking indicator for the economy. In August, the lack of new orders rose to 44.2%, up from 40.3% in July and a lot more than 13.8% in 2022.

Germany’s prestigious ifo Institute informs us that cancellations in residential construction have reached a record high. In August, 20.7% of companies reported canceled projects. The building industry is in trouble. Rising interest rates, soaring costs and weaker demand threaten to force many firms out of business. Several real estate groups are filing for insolvency. Germany is facing a shortage of 700,000 homes, and its housing crisis is bound to intensify. Last year, 295,300 dwellings were built, well short of the 400,000 target, and this year the gap will be worse.

Industrial gloom is deepening too. The Federal Statistical Office’s September 7 press release reveals that industrial production “was down 0.8% in July 2023 month on month after seasonal and calendar adjustment.” Carmaking has declined dramatically. Rising energy prices have hit German industry hard, and Europe’s manufacturing superpower has shrunk or stagnated for the past three quarters.

Even before September, stories about the German economy have been pessimistic. On July 24, Reuters reported that “activity in Germany, Europe’s largest economy, contracted in July.” Investor confidence has been plummeting and foreign direct investment in Germany falling. The OECD expects the German economy to stagnate and be the worst performer among the major economies in 2023.

In August, the ifo Business Climate Index fell for the fourth consecutive time. Sentiment among German managers darkened in manufacturing, services, trade and construction. The index is at its lowest level since August 2020, and companies are increasingly pessimistic about the months ahead. 

The Hamburg Commercial Bank’s Purchasing Managers’ Index (HCOB PMI) shows that German factory output has deteriorated at a rate not seen since 2009, the pandemic years excepted. Given that manufacturing accounts for a quarter of the German GDP, the fall in HCOB PMI is rather alarming. 

On July 13, Matthew Karnitschnig in Berlin published a piece titled “Rust on the Rhine” in Politico. He described how “German companies are ditching the fatherland.” In Karnitschnig’s words, “Confronted by a toxic cocktail of high energy costs, worker shortages and reams of red tape, many of Germany’s biggest companies — from giants like Volkswagen and Siemens to a host of lesser-known, smaller ones — are experiencing a rude awakening and scrambling for greener pastures in North America and Asia.”

Politico has been grim about the German economy for a while. On November 10, 2022, Johanna Treeck published “Mittel-kaput? German industry stares into the abyss,” asking whether the prolonged energy crisis was causing “the beginning of the end for German industry.”

Not only manufacturing but also services are now declining. High inflation and rising interest rates are taking a toll on consumer confidence. Unemployment is rising. Once, the land of the Mittelstand — the small- and medium-sized industry that arose in the late 19th century and long powered the economy — was a world leader in innovation. That is no longer the case. In the World Intellectual Property Organization’s “Global Innovation Index 2022,” Germany only ranks eighth among world economies. Three European economies — Switzerland, the UK and the Netherlands — are ranked above it.

In a nutshell, Germany is in big trouble. Why?

Russia–Ukraine war spikes inflation

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, German industry increasingly relied on cheap Russian gas. Nord Stream 1 was a lifeline for Germany and Nord Stream 2 was set to begin operations too. Then, the Russia–Ukraine War upended German industry. Post-Nazi peacenik Berlin had not expected war to break out in Europe again. Germany had not diversified its energy supplies and was caught with its pants down.

In fact, Gerhard Schröder, Germany’s former chancellor, became the head of the supervisory board of Rosneft, a Russian oil giant, and was nominated to join the board of Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas exporter, in his post-political career. Schröder had led the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s party, and served as chancellor from 1998 to 2005. His reforms in the early 2000s transformed Germany from “the sick man of Europe” into the continent’s economic engine.

Schröder refused to support George W. Bush’s 2003 Iraq War and, in the words of The Economist, was a “vocal advocate of Ostpolitik, a policy of rapprochement with the eastern bloc, including the then Soviet Union, conceived in the late 1960s by Willy Brandt, another SPD chancellor.” Many damn Schröder as Putin’s lobbyist today, and it is true that he has made big money from Russian energy giants. However, Schröder and many other Germans genuinely wanted to tie Russia into “an energy partnership of mutual dependence with Europe.”

All of that came to an end on February 24, 2022. Fuel, food, fertilizer and other commodity prices shot up. In particular, this supply-side shock caused inflation to skyrocket in Europe, especially because, unlike Canada and the US, the continent does not have substantial oil and gas reserves.

Germany suffered more than others even in Europe. Postwar Germany has been an idealistic nation where a strong environmentalist movement became politically powerful. After all, the Greens are currently in a coalition government with the SPD. In fact, Germany attempted a green energy transformation, the so-called Energiewende. As the war was stopping the supply of Russian gas, Germany was switching off all nuclear power. 

Sadly for Germany, this move caused an energy scarcity. Germany simply did not produce enough renewable energy to take up the slack. This exacerbated the inflationary shock, and Germans ended up paying three times the international average for electricity.

Inflation increased input costs for manufacturing. In parallel, when central banks raised interest rates to combat inflation, the borrowing costs for industry shot up, as did the servicing costs on debt that was not locked in under old rates. For years, German industry had gotten used to low interest rates. Just like the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank had followed a policy of quantitative easing, which really means printing more money. This meant that the cost of capital was really cheap for companies. That cheap money era is over, and companies are scrambling to adjust to the new higher cost of capital.

Furthermore, the double whammy of increasing inflation and rising interest rates has hit consumer confidence hard. Even in the best of times, culturally Protestant Germans are savers, not spenders. Now, they are spending even less. They have more incentive to keep the money in the bank instead of spending it. Naturally, demand for goods and services is falling, and the economy is stagnating.

Chinese economy crashes, demand for German imports crashes too

In recent years, Germany has profited greatly from trade with China. After Deng Xiaoping opened up the economy in 1978, the Middle Kingdom grew spectacularly. Even as China became the factory of the world, Germany provided the machines that kept this factory running. Naturally, German exports to China boomed.

When this author traveled around the eastern seaboard of China in 2004, he met German businessmen everywhere. Almost all of them were exporting their goods to the Middle Kingdom. By the 20th century, China was Germany’s most important trading partner. Bilateral trade volumes amounted to $237 billion (€204 billion) in 2018.

On October 24, 2019, DHL published a piece titled, “As China Sneezes, Will Germany Catch a Cold?” It posited that “China’s weakening domestic economy and the ongoing trade tensions simmering between Washington and Beijing” would take a toll on the German economy.

DHL’s piece turned out to be prescient. As the US–China trade war has heated up, Germany has found itself squeezed in the middle. Increasingly, China sees Germany as a US ally. So, Beijing has been discouraging German imports into China implicitly and explicitly. In the first four months of 2023, German exports fell by 11.3% as compared to last year.

German ardor for China has cooled too. The Bundesbank, Germany’s renowned central bank, has warned German companies to cut exposure to China, warning that “the country’s business model is in danger.” No fewer than 29% of German companies import essential materials and parts from China. Rising US–China geopolitical tensions could disrupt this trade, bringing the German economy to a grinding halt.

Earlier in July, Germany’s 64-page “Strategy on China” attempted to chart a new policy towards the Middle Kingdom. It states, “China has changed. As a result of this and China’s political decisions, we need to change our approach to China.” This document goes on to say, “China is Germany’s largest single trading partner, but whereas China’s dependencies on Europe are constantly declining, Germany’s dependencies on China have taken on greater significance in recent years.” The new German strategy deems China a “systemic” rival and “accepts competition with China.”

Yet it is not easy for the land of the Mittelstand to decouple from the Middle Kingdom. German industry is still expanding in China. In July, BASF broke ground on a polyethylene plant at its seventh Verbund site in Zhanjiang, China. Even as this German manufacturing giant is investing $10 billion (€9.4 billion) in China, it is cutting 2,600 jobs and reducing production in Germany. A slowing Chinese economy has hurt BASF this year, with the company’s second-quarter net income falling to $533.38 million (€499 million) from $2.24 billion (€2.1 billion) in the same quarter a year earlier. When China sneezes, Germany indeed catches a cold. 

Germany’s dependence on China made Scholz fly all the way from Berlin to Beijing on a state visit on November 4, 2022. The chancellor took along a gaggle of German CEOs to meet President Xi Jinping and Chinese authorities. Scholz’s visit was the first by a G7 leader to China in three years, and the chancellor flew back without even staying the night. Unfortunately for Germany, this visit has not yielded much in the way of results, and its new China policy has undercut Scholz’s pilgrimage to Xi. The German economy now faces a China dilemma, and there are no easy choices ahead.

US protectionism hurts Germany’s export-oriented economy

Since the 1980s, the champion of global free trade has suffered from deindustrialization. People in the rust belt are angry and hurt by the loss of manufacturing jobs. In part, this resentment fueled Donald Trump to the presidency. In office, Trump adopted protectionism as a means to revive American industry and repeatedly threatened tariffs on German cars. During Trump’s time at the White House, trade ties between the US and the EU remained tense.

Joe Biden’s presidency was supposed to change that. Instead, Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has upset America’s European allies. French President Emmanuel Macron sounded the bugle against the IRA, arguing that Europe needed an urgent response amounting to a whopping 2% of the EU’s GDP. Like China, the US is now subsidizing critical sectors of its economy. After decades, the US now has a full-blown industrial policy that subsidizes semiconductors, green energy and other technologies of the future. Posh think tanks in Washington are now breathlessly trumpeting the idea of GeoTech Wars.

After China, Germany is the country most hurt by the Biden administration’s new industrial policy. It has made timid Berlin ally with flamboyant Paris in calling for a joint EU response to the IRA. The Europeans argue that US subsidies tied to locally produced goods are worth $207 billion. This disadvantages European companies, contravenes World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and further erodes the world trade order.

As a result of the new American industrial policy, German companies are finding it increasingly difficult to export to the US. Note that exports matter a great deal to Germany. They comprise 50.3% of the GDP. In contrast, exports comprise only 10.9% of the US GDP. Last year, a German CEO and a member of the Bundestag, the German parliament, complained bitterly to the author about American protectionism in two separate conversations. Both remarked that the US was kicking Germany when this loyal ally was not on its knees but on its back.

A key reason for German economic troubles is that the post-1991 order is now dead. The US championed free trade and globalization for the last three decades. After the initially painful adjustment after reunification, the German economy boomed. Fueled by cheap Russian energy, Germany became a manufacturing powerhouse and an exporting superpower. In 2012, the BBC celebrated “a country whose inhabitants work fewer hours than almost any others, whose workforce is not particularly productive and whose children spend less time at school than most of its neighbors.”

What a difference a decade makes. Today, Germany is once again “the sick man of Europe” and The Financial Times reports a German manufacturer complaining, “everything is tired here.” In this post-globalization world, reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring are the new buzzwords in the US. Washington, the architect of free trade and globalization, is turning its back on those ideas. Germany, which profited immensely from that system, is struggling to adapt.

Germany has its own self-inflicted wounds too

Like India and France, Germany is infamous for its red tape. There are innumerable forms to fill and boxes to tick before starting and while running any business. Approvals take too long. Environmental, labor and governance standards are unrealistically high, making entrepreneurship and business activity in Germany notoriously difficult.

Unlike India and France, the German political leadership is more candid about its economic problems. In an uncharacteristically bold speech, the mild-mannered Scholz declared in the Bundestag, his intention to “shake off the mildew of bureaucracy, risk aversion and despondency that has settled on our country over years and decades.” The trick for Scholz is to emulate Schröder and implement far-reaching reforms. 

Unlike Schröder, Scholz does not command a majority in the Bundestag and is in charge of a fractious coalition, comprising the SPD, the Greens and the liberal Free Democrats. This traffic light coalition named after the colors of the three parties —  red, green and yellow — has been plagued by infighting and has found it difficult to get anything done.

Meanwhile, Germany has many other problems that need to be addressed quickly. Manufacturers complain taxes and labor costs are too high. They are not only moving production to other EU members and Asia but also to the US and even the Brexit-afflicted UK. High taxation is also the reason talent hesitates from moving to Germany. In 2018, Deutsche Welle, Germany’s reputable state-owned international broadcaster, reported that if “you’re single with no kids and thinking about working in Germany” then “your tax burden will be 15 percentage points higher than the average among rich-income countries.”

In part, labor costs are high because Germany faces an acute shortage of workers. In June, the Federal Labor Agency’s annual analysis found that 200 out of about 1,200 professions surveyed had labor shortages in 2022, up from 148 in 2021. Germany is struggling to fill jobs “in nursing care, child care, the construction industry and automotive technology, along with truck drivers, architects, pharmacists and information technology specialists.” Improving labor immigration is high on the government’s agenda, but little progress has been made so far.

Germans work 1,341 hours per year, the least in the OECD. In contrast, Americans work 1,811 hours annually. Managers complain of a decline in Germany’s fabled work ethic. Many have confided to the author that the quality of candidates for Germany’s impressive apprenticeship programs has fallen significantly from even a decade ago. The Financial Times has also heard similar complaints.

For decades, much of the world has admired Germany’s dual education system. It combines vocational training with apprenticeships. This has made German labor highly skilled and its industry competitive. Now, fewer people are enrolling in vocational training and apprenticeships. In 2022, 469,000 people took up apprenticeships, approximately 100,000 fewer than in 2011.

Germany’s declining demography amplifies its labor shortages. As per the Federal Statistical Office, deaths exceeded births by 327,000 in 2022 and there were just 1.53 births per woman in 2020, well short of the replacement level fertility of 2.1 births per woman. This means that Germany’s population is shrinking and it simply does not have enough people to work in the various sectors of its economy. In May, Deutsche Welle published a story titled, “Germany’s labor crisis is an economic time bomb.” The government has admitted that it will lack seven million workers by 2035. 

An aging population causes a rising pension burden as well potentially higher taxation on a shrinking labor force to support Germany’s rather generous welfare state. This means that most skilled workers are likely to prefer to immigrate to countries like the US, Canada and Australia, which have the English language advantage as well.

Fair Observer’s economist author Alex Gloy, also points out how Germany has missed the boat in software and digitalization. According to Gloy, “the only German software company to speak of is SAP, which was founded 1972. Germany has no social media company. The only dynamic sector is delivery startups. But you have 30 of them in Berlin, right next to each other. This makes absolutely no sense.”

Germany’s weakness in the digital economy and infrastructure needed for this economy has made it rely on Huawei for 5G. That is an apple of discord with Uncle Sam, which wants Germany to use more expensive American infrastructure instead. The US has also pressured Germany to increase its defense expenditure for years. Germany finally agreed to do so in the light of the Russia-Ukraine War. Yet this increased expenditure will increase the tax burden for Germans unless Berlin imposes austerity measures on its citizens. 

The German economy needs to make major reforms and painful decisions. To steal a word from Scholz’s February 27, 2022 speech to the Bundestag, the economy faces a Zeitenwende — a historic turning point — because business as usual in the post-2022 world simply will not suffice. Sadly, Scholz’s weak traffic light coalition has little appetite for tough decisions and the German economy faces a few painful years ahead.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is the German Economy Now Destined to Decline? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The wording in Article IX, Section 1, of Montana’s constitution couldn’t be clearer: “The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.” Accordingly, in April, a district court judge in Yellowstone County voided a permit for a natural-gas-fired power plant under construction there. Over its lifetime, it would have released an estimated 23 million tons of planet-roasting carbon dioxide. That, ruled the judge, was incompatible with a “clean and healthful environment” in Montana or, for that matter, anywhere else.

Within a week, the state legislature voted to reinforce a 2011 law barring the consideration of climate change in policymaking and so allowing the construction of the power plant to resume. But that wasn’t the end of the matter. Last month, the lawmakers were slapped down a second time when another district judge ruled in favor of a group of 16 youthful Montanans in a suit filed in 2020 seeking to strike down that very 2011 anti-climate legislation.

Young plaintiffs beat the legislature

In her ruling, Judge Kathy Seeley wrote, “Montana’s climate, environment, and natural resources are unconstitutionally degraded and depleted due to the current atmospheric concentration of [greenhouse gases] and climate change.” She added that “every additional ton of greenhouse gas emissions exacerbates Plaintiffs’ injuries and risks locking in irreversible climate injuries.” The state, she made it abundantly clear, is obligated to correct such a situation.

The plaintiffs were all in their teens or younger when they filed their suit, Held v. Montana, three years ago. Our Children’s Trust, a nonprofit group, represented them. Since 2011, it has been pursuing climate action on behalf of this country’s youth in the courts of all 50 states. The Montana case was simply the first to go to trial. The second, a climate case against the Hawaii Department of Transportation, is scheduled to begin next summer. 

Matt Rosendale, a Montana Republican serving in the House of Representatives, responded to the Held decision with the worst sort of condescending bluster. “This is not a school project,” he insisted. “It’s a courtroom … Judge Seeley did a huge disservice to the courts and to these youths by allowing them to be used as pawns in the Left’s poorly thought-out plan to ruin our power grid and compromise our national security in the name of their Green New Fantasy.”

The only fantasy, however, was Rosendale’s characterization of the proceedings. The plaintiffs’ case was overwhelmingly persuasive. They presented extensive testimony from climate and pediatric health experts to make their case. They showed that people younger than 25 were going to be especially vulnerable to the many impacts climate change is going to have on physical and psychological health. In her ruling, Seeley summarized some of the damages to which the plaintiffs had testified. 

All of the young people in the suit were afflicted with allergies and asthma (three especially severely). They had suffered significant health problems thanks to the unavoidable inhalation of smoke from North America’s ever-increasing wildfires. Much of that damage had occurred during Montana’s horrendous fire seasons of 2017 (when more than 2,400 fires burned across 1.4 million acres of the state) and 2021 (when more than 2,500 fires burned almost 1 million more), followed, of course, by the smoke from the devastating and ongoing Canadian wildfires of this spring and summer. 

Three Indigenous plaintiffs testified that climate disruption has already ensured that their traditional sources of food and medicinal plants would become ever scarcer. As a result, they cannot take part in their usual cultural practices, including ones involving snow, which is increasingly scarce. As the lawsuit put it, the changing planet has “disrupted tribal spiritual practices and longstanding rhythms of tribal life by changing the timing of natural events like bird migration.”

Testimony also showed that the extreme heat of recent summers, only expected to grow more severe in the coming years, is threatening the health of the plaintiffs. All of the plaintiffs engage in extensive outdoor work or recreation. Those who participate in competitive sports have seen their training severely curtailed by summer heat (and for one of them, a Nordic skier, by lack of winter snow). The plaintiffs’ ability to hunt and fish, especially important in Montana, is being dramatically limited by drought and wildfire.

Some of the plaintiffs testified that increasing damage from storms, flooding, wildfires and drought will make it ever more difficult, if not impossible, to keep their family’s property intact for coming generations. Backed by the testimony of several experts, the young plaintiffs explained how the increasing chaos brought on by climate change had left them with feelings of deep distress, despair and loss.

Rosendale undoubtedly read none of their testimony, which made it so much easier for him to callously dismiss their plight while accusing them of being witless “pawns” of far greater forces. How, after all, could anyone have been left unmoved by the poignant testimony of 20-year-old Olivia Vesovich? She told the court that, given the severe and ever-worsening impact of climate change, she “would not want to make a child endure that. It is one of the greatest sadnesses of my life — and my family is one of the most important parts of my life — that I may not be starting a family of my own. It breaks my heart, it really does.”

Plaintiffs from the future

From the 1990s through the first two decades of this century, academic discussion of “intergenerational climate justice” weighed the interests of the “current generation” against those of “future generations.” Current generations may or may not do what’s needed to end greenhouse gas emissions; future generations lack any say in the matter, but they will nonetheless suffer its increasingly severe consequences. (Of course, those of us in privileged societies have also largely ignored the billions of people globally with no say in the matter and so the functional equivalents of those “future generations.”)

Now, with heat waves, megafires, increasingly severe freak storms and floods striking ever more often, those at-risk future generations are finally beginning to show up, well ahead of schedule. That, after all, is just what the Held plaintiffs are, as are the young Global South activists who shook up the most recent world climate summits by refusing to accept the selling-out of their future.

Though it’s cited often enough in relation to climate change, there’s nothing magical about the year 2050. It’s just a nice, round, midcentury number. That’s undoubtedly why world climate negotiators have chosen it as the target year for national pledges to drive greenhouse gas emissions down to zero.

Come 2050, the Montana plaintiffs will only be in their thirties and forties. By that time, they should know whether the world acted boldly enough in the 2020s to turn the climate emergency around.

In court, the young plaintiffs expressed deep concern not only for their own health and well-being but for those of their potential children and grandchildren. What kind of future will they and their kids face? For one thing, those still living in Montana in 2050 can expect to deal with wildfire and smoke disasters far worse than the ones endured in 2017, 2021 or 2023. Without drastic action much of Montana is predicted to see a 600% increase in the incidence of “very large wildfires” (those covering 20 square miles or more) between 2041 and 2070.

The fire risk will have been raised largely by intensifying global heat. Consider this warning from US government scientists. Should the world economy carry on with business-as-usual in the coming decades, a

teenager in eastern Montana in 2075 might experience maximum summer temperatures that his or her grandparents would have had to travel to the Mojave Desert to see, [while] a child born in southern Texas in 2060 might experience as much as 6 weeks per summer when maximum temperatures are hotter than his or her grandparents experienced just once per year. And in this same future, a child in the southeastern United States can expect to spend more than half of his or her summer experiencing heat waves that would have occurred only 3 days per year for his or her grandparents.

Unless there are steep reductions in global carbon emissions, Montana will be eternally burning, while much of the country to the south and east grows even hotter and more unbearably humid.

So, should young Montanans migrate north to Canada? At one time, that seemed like a viable climate escape route. But in 2023, with a large share of the US population inhaling smoke from the extraordinarily vast and intense wildfires burning across that country, month after month, northward migration could just be a jump from the frying pan into the all-too-literal fire.

Constitutional right to a future

Such dire forecasts are based on worst-case “business-as-usual” scenarios, and that’s important. After all, catastrophe is not inevitable. If today’s youth find themselves facing such nightmares in the 2050s, it will be because our nation and the rest of the world didn’t act in a necessary fashion in this decade. Such conditions can indeed be prevented, but only if the climate struggle intensifies.

When the Held plaintiffs filed their suit in 2020, only two of them were old enough to vote in that fall’s election. But, as Judge Seeley ruled, they all had standing to challenge the fossil-fuel juggernaut in a court of law. And so far, they’re winning.

Amber Polk, assistant professor of law at Florida International University, focuses her studies on new legal claims by the environmental rights movement. She recently wrote a short history of “green amendments” — constitutional provisions like the section of Article IX on which Held relied. Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana and Pennsylvania all added such provisions to their state constitutions in the 1970s as environmentalism was surging. But in the 1980s and 1990s, legal cases based on green amendments foundered. That was until 1999, when the supreme court of — you guessed it! — Montana struck down laws that permitted water pollution, basing its decision on the constitutional “right” of state residents “to a clean and healthful environment.”

Fourteen years later, Pennsylvania’s supreme court relied on a similar green amendment to strike down a law permitting hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) statewide. Until Held, though, green amendments had not been used to challenge laws explicitly affecting climate policy. Count on one thing, however: They will be widely tested in the coming years (though a conservative, anything-but-environmentalist supreme court could prove a problem in wielding them).

The Montana case, writes Polk,

sets a groundbreaking precedent for climate litigation and demonstrates a new way in which green amendments can be invoked to elicit environmental change. It suggests that in other states with green amendments, state laws cannot forbid the consideration of greenhouse gas emissions and their climate impact during environmental review… In the states that have green amendments, climate advocates will certainly rely on the Montana youth case as they challenge state laws that promote climate change.

Expect ever more challenges in places where such green amendments exist. New York passed one last year and 13 other states — some red, like Montana, some blue, some purple — are considering them, according to Polk.

Unfortunately, only limited reductions of greenhouse gases can be achieved via state-by-state challenges to bad laws. Congressional action would be needed to, for example, achieve the most essential policy of all: a rapid, mandatory phase-out of oil, natural gas and coal nationwide. You would, however, need a very different Congress to have a hope in hell of passing such a bill.

Still, such a phase-out is a goal of Juliana v. United States, another youth climate lawsuit, originally filed in federal court in 2015 and still pending after eight long years. The 21 plaintiffs, aged seven to 19 at the time of its filing and backed by Our Children’s Trust, allege that the federal government has illegally permitted the continued extraction and burning of fossil fuels. The government did this despite knowing that they cause “dangerous concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere and a dangerous climate system, and irreversible harm to the natural systems critical to Plaintiffs’ rights to life, liberty, and property.” These activities, the lawsuit adds, “unconstitutionally favor the present, temporary economic benefits of certain citizens, especially corporations, over Plaintiffs’ rights to life, liberty, and property.”

In Juliana, the youthful plaintiffs are asking the courts to order the federal government to take wide-ranging, ambitious climate action, including “to prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.”

Three administrations — Obama’s, Trump’s and now Biden’s — have vigorously fought back against the youths’ case and, in 2021, it appeared doomed when an appeals court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing. This summer, however, Juliana came back from the dead when a federal judge in Oregon ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed to trial after amending their filing. The case remains in limbo, however, thanks to continued fierce opposition from President Biden’s Department of Justice. As CNN reported, the DOJ “has argued there is no federal public trust doctrine that creates a right for a stable climate system for US citizens.”

Such a refusal to take climate disruption seriously came even as the president was touring the country and bragging about energy and electric-vehicle projects related to the climate provisions in last year’s Inflation Reduction Act. Biden, it seems, is happy to take credit for limited green actions but not faintly ready to plan for truly phasing out fossil fuels and so keeping the world livable through this century and beyond.

So, give some credit to the young who are pushing him, the courts and Congress to ensure that they have a future worth living for. In truth, nothing matters more than that.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Young Kids Win Big Climate Lawsuit In Montana appeared first on Fair Observer.

Afghanistan under the Taliban’s leadership is a place of incredible confusion and ambivalence. Economic growth stagnates, rival leaders jostle for power, rebellions break out repeatedly, the Taliban crush them ruthlessly even as they pay lip service to the international community while silencing women and minorities, and foreign relations rapidly deteriorate as mistrust mounts.

In this episode of FO° Podcasts, Bilal Rahmani explains exactly how the Taliban are transforming Afghanistan into an oppressive pariah state through rank incompetence and self-enriching policy decisions. Eventually, this downward spiral of corruption and violence could spell an end to the modern borders of Afghanistan. 

Economic stagnation and brutal oppression

Restoring some semblance of normalcy in the Taliban’s Afghanistan has been incredibly difficult. Policy around economic activity shifts on the whims of elder militant leaders. Some days, entire sectors, like women’s beauty salons, are told to close. On other days, crops are simply not allowed to leave the country, killing exports. Operating on this shifting ground has created new risks in Afghanistan’s economy. Business planning has become impossible because the Taliban make economic policy on a whim. 

Land seizures by the Taliban are the most egregious example of a toxic economic environment. The Taliban’s Ministry of Justice is seizing agricultural or housing land en masse and redistributing it to Taliban leaders. These seizures force many Afghans off their land and deprive them of their livelihoods. Furthermore, these warlords are probably the least productive members of society. The land grab is making Taliban leaders rent-seeking parasitical landlords who live off the blood, sweat and toil of ordinary Afghans.

Just as the Taliban are deciding who are the winners in Afghanistan’s economy, they are also anointing the winners in society. The Taliban have deemed Pashtun men as the undisputed top dogs in Afghanistan. Fanatical Islamist policies that interpret the Koran literally deny women education, bar them from jobs, prevent them from traveling alone and reduce them to second-class members of society.

Even when women are given rights by the Taliban leadership — often to appease international organizations or foreign governments — ground-level Taliban members unleash violence and intimidation to ensure that women do not exercise their rights. Fearing for their safety, women are increasingly excluding themselves from normal social activities and living in hiding.

Ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks have also found themselves on the losing side of the new Taliban-led state that dispenses patronage overwhelmingly to Pashtuns. The Taliban are seizing ancestral Hazara and Tajik lands. There is a distinct punitive military character to the land seizures. Taliban leaders do not feel the need to negotiate with their historical ethnic rivals. Instead, they are following medieval tactics and using extreme military force and human rights abuses to take away land from those they consider their enemies.

The Taliban bait and switch and the future of Afghanistan

The Taliban have proved that they are neither competent nor cohesive. They are now targeting Pakistan to win domestic legitimacy. Simply put, the Taliban are using their insurgent tactics to take back their ancestral ethnic Pashtun lands in Pakistan and create Pashtunistan, a new state that reclaims the historic lands of the Pashtuns.

This shift in the Taliban’s paradigm has caught Pakistan napping. Ironically, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) once backed the Taliban. This dreaded military intelligence wanted strategic depth against India and aimed to use Pashtun jihadis in Kashmir. Now that the Taliban are in charge, they do not feel beholden to the ISI. They have turned their guns on Pakistan itself. Alarmingly, Taliban forces have already clashed with Pakistani troops.

Some senior leaders in the Taliban do not want relations with Pakistan to deteriorate. They are resorting to both direct talks and shuttle diplomacy. Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, the ISI chief, visited Kabul recently to smooth ruffled feathers. In a very public appearance, he told journalists not to worry and that “everything would be okay.” However, Hameed might be putting on a brave face because the more ethnonationalist members of the Taliban fanatically believe in the creation of Pashtunistan.

Just as the Taliban seek to redraw the borders of modern Afghanistan and Pakistan to benefit the Pashtun people, Afghanistan’s many ethnic groups have carved out their own centers of power for self-preservation. Militant rebellions have broken out. Mawlawi Mehdi Mujahid, a Hazara leader, and the National Resistance Front, composed chiefly of Tajiks, have rebelled. So far, the Taliban have been successful at quashing these rebellions. They deploy overwhelming force to quash the rebellion and maintain control over rebel territories. However, rebellions still keep erupting to challenge the Taliban.

Such rebellions will continue. During the Afghan Civil War, Abdul Rashid Dostum created a proto-state for ethnic Uzbek Afghans. With the Taliban repeatedly threatening the lives and livelihoods of ethnic minorities, they are bound to create Dostum-style enclaves for survival. At some point, multiple rebellions might erupt simultaneously and threaten Taliban rule.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Make Sense of the Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan appeared first on Fair Observer.

Since World War II, the US has a history of launching wars that never result in victory and almost always produce collateral damage on a scale no other wars from the past can rival. Every nation that has endured on its territory US military activity has found itself permanently disfigured in its national identity. After 50 years of wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and now Ukraine — to mention the obvious ones — Vietnam alone has emerged with some sense of national unity and the keys to prosperity. This may be due to the fact that its struggle lasted longer than any of the others and ended in what was perceived as a resounding defeat of the US.

No serious observer of history can deny that the cost of US inspired wars, generally launched in the name of defending the principles of “freedom and democracy,” has been unambiguously catastrophic for the nations concerned, in the long term as well as the short term. No one can deny two other obvious historical facts. The first is that the US has been nearly constantly involved in wars over the past 75 years. The second is that none of those wars has resulted in anything resembling a victory, except perhaps for the armament industries. That is what makes made last week’s statement by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, evoking an eventual war with China, sound simultaneously comic (ridiculous) and tragic (Aristotle’s “pity and fear”).

“We’re all talking,” Kendall explained, “about the fact that the Air and Space Forces must change, or we could fail to prevent and might even lose a war.” Does he really see the possibility of the US losing a war as remote, as straining credibility? Can any American, let alone on top military officer, continue to believe that because the US clearly does have the most powerful military force in the history of the world, that means it routinely wins wars?

I can understand why it’s convenient for members of the political and military establishment to express their eternal optimism and discount the glaring reality of history. When evoking a war not with Vietnam or Libya but against China, a mighty nation with a nuclear arsenal: “Our job is to deter that war and to be ready to win if it occurs.” In Kendall’s mind, defeating a nuclear power in war is just a question of doing “our job.”

Are journalists themselves examples of artificial intelligence?

I find it much more difficult to understand why journalists never react to, let alone challenge, this dangerously ahistorical optimism. A war with China, even if were engaged on a limited scale, would imperil the entire human race. Does the idea of “winning” that war make sense to members of the media? As objective observers, they should be aware of two simple facts: that the US simply does not win wars and that if such a war were to break out between two nuclear powers, there is a strong likelihood that there will only be losers.

Puzzled by the lazy indifference of the media, I decided to interrogate ChatGPT, known for its supposed historical objectivity. It’s good with historical facts, but is it capable of understanding and interpreting the patterns of history?

I therefore formulated the following very detailed prompt, just to make sure my question would be understood:

“There is hardly anyone alive who believes that the US war in Vietnam was justified. Everyone recognizes it was disastrous for anyone involved in it. It was even disastrous for many people not involved in it, myself included, because the conscription policy interrupted my own academic career as I was pursuing a post-graduate degree at Oxford. In short, it was costly in blood, treasure and human psychology. It was particularly bad for the image of the United States as the leading player in the free world.

Whereas there are still a few people who claim that toppling Saddam Hussein was the right thing to do because he was an evil despot, nearly everyone agrees that the war in Iraq was unjustified, provoked on false pretences and led to a long series of disasters, including provoking the rise of ISIS.

And while many still think the war on Afghanistan was a justified response to the events of 9/11, historians have shown that it could have been avoided and that the Taliban themselves were willing to arrest Bin Laden, who was the aggressor, not the Taliban themselves. But whether justified or not, the war produced 20 years of catastrophic policies and a shamed US retreat, handing victory to the Taliban.

The American war effort in Libya and Syria, though slightly less direct, can be analyzed in a similar way. In all these cases, entire populations have suffered. Many European nations, allies of the US, have been destabilized by the resulting refugee crisis, provoking a rise of the neo-fascist right. At the same time, the standing of the US on the world stage has become seriously tarnished.

A similar pattern, though less direct, characterizes the current war in Ukraine. In other words, can a historian surveying the past 60 years of US history fail to conclude that US administrations, whether Democrat or Republican, are addicted to implementing a foreign policy that is destructive both for the regimes they decide they don’t like and for the US itself?”

ChatGPT’s response contained no surprises.

“The assessment of whether the United States’ foreign policy decisions over the past 60 years have been consistently destructive is a matter of perspective and debate. It’s important to recognize that foreign policy decisions are complex, often driven by a combination of factors, including geopolitical considerations, domestic politics, intelligence assessments, and the specific circumstances of each situation. Additionally, opinions on these matters can vary widely, and historians may have different interpretations of the same events.”

I see this position, which I prefer to call an attitude, in practically every dialogue I have with ChatGPT. It boils down to a refusal to even consider the reality of patterns, let alone interpret them. In that sense, it reflects the dominant political culture that prefers we not waste time thinking about patterns.

This concern with over-interpretation may make some sense when there is inconsistency in the evidence being analyzed. But, as one of the world’s greatest authorities on international relations, John Mearsheimer insists, the US track record on war is remarkably consistent. In an online interview he explains: “we in the United States specially, and the West more generally, have a very poor understanding of the limits of power,” before adding that “in the West that lesson was never learned.”

In other words, ChatGPT prefers to dutifully repeat what Frank Kendall and most Westerners believe, despite its being manifestly false. It is correct when it tells us reality is complex. But discernible patterns reveal broader principles at work capable of clarifying the complexity without contradicting it. ChatGPT sees the trees but denies the forest.

ChatGPT’s detailed “analysis” and evasive conclusion

In its response to my prompt, ChatGPT offered a detailed examination of recent US wars, effectively focusing on every tree in order to suppress the idea that a forest even exists.

“Vietnam War: As you mentioned, the Vietnam War is widely seen as a costly and tragic conflict. However, there were differing motivations behind U.S. involvement, including containment of communism during the Cold War. Some argue that the war was a strategic mistake, while others contend that it was a necessary effort to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.

Iraq War: The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 remains a highly contentious issue. While some believed it was justified based on concerns about weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein’s regime, others argue that the war was initiated on false pretenses and had devastating consequences. Opinions on this issue are deeply divided.

War in Afghanistan: The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks had broad international support at the time. However, as the conflict prolonged, questions arose about its effectiveness and long-term consequences.

Libya and Syria: These conflicts were complex and involved international efforts to address ongoing crises within those countries. The outcomes have been mixed, with some arguing that intervention was necessary to protect civilians, while others highlight the destabilizing effects.

Ukraine: The situation in Ukraine is ongoing and complex. It involves a mix of geopolitical interests and regional tensions, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about its long-term impact.

ChatGPT then develops a few more paragraphs riffing on the virtue of complexity before proposing its lesson that effectively denies Mearsheimer’s reference to a “lesson” nobody has learned:

“In conclusion, while there have been instances where U.S. foreign policy decisions have faced criticism and have had adverse consequences, the overall assessment is a matter of ongoing debate and interpretation. Different people and experts will have varying opinions on the impact and wisdom of these policies.”

Mearsheimer’s understanding of patterns allows him to dig deeper and discover the logical principles that guide the policy of what he calls “An incredibly hawkish country.”

“I think the United States is in a situation where it can cause lots of trouble and it does not pay much of a price.”

Noting that “none of its soldiers are dying,” he explains that for Americans, losing “doesn’t matter that much… It can run around the world doing all sorts of foolish things and not pay a significant price. It’s others who pay the price.”

Bucking ChatGPT’s recommendation of simply accepting complexity and abandoning the pursuit of meaning, Mearsheimer offers a simple but very credible explanation of the brainless policies that have led to so many failed efforts and so much predictable destruction.

“The sheer power of the United States, the sheer sense of security that Americans have that allow them to pursue these foolish policies.”

*[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At Fair Observer, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Outside the Box: Can Foreign Policy Be Consistently Stupid? appeared first on Fair Observer.

It’s an ocean of conflict and ecological decline. Despite its vast size — 1.3 million square miles — the South China Sea has become a microcosm of the geopolitical tensions between East and West, where territorial struggles over abundant natural resources may one day lead to environmental collapse.

While the threat of a devastating military conflict between China and the United States in the region still looms, the South China Sea has already experienced irreparable damage. Decades of over-harvesting have, for instance, had a disastrous impact on that sea’s once-flourishing fish. The tuna, mackerel, and shark populations have fallen to 50% of their 1960s levels. Biologically critical coral reef atolls are already struggling to survive rising ocean temperatures. Now, they are also being buried under sand and silt as the Chinese military lays claim to and builds on the disputed Spratly Islands, an archipelago of 14 small isles and 113 reefs. Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam have also laid claim to many of the same islands.

Perhaps no one should be surprised, since oil and gas deposits are plentiful in the South China Sea. The US government estimates that 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are ready to be extracted from its floor. Such fossil-fuel reserves, some believe, are helping to — yes, how can anyone not use the word? — fuel the turmoil increasingly engulfing the region.

This year, the Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative reported that several countries are pursuing new oil and gas development projects in those contested waters. The organization notes that these waters could become a “flashpoint in the disputes.” Between 2018 and 2021, there were numerous standoffs between China, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries over drilling operations there. Fears are building that even more severe confrontations lie ahead.

The United States, of course, lays the blame for all of this on China, claiming its aggressive island-reclamation projects violate international law and “militarize an already tense and contested area.” Yet the US is also playing a significant part in raising tensions in the region by agreeing to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines as part of its Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact.

The goal, no doubt, is to restrain Chinese activity with the threat of Western military might. “Next steps could include basing US nuclear-capable platforms — such as strategic bombers — in Australia as well as cooperation on hypersonic missiles, cyber operations [and] quantum computing,” writes Derek Grossman for the Rand Corporation, the “paramilitary academy” of American defense policy. In fact, the US is evidently preparing to deploy the first nuclear-capable B-52s to that country soon.

On August 25th, in partnership with Australia and the Philippines (where Washington is getting ready to occupy bases ever closer to China), US Marines practiced retaking an “island” supposedly captured by hostile forces. In that exercise,1,760 Australian and Filipino soldiers and 120 US Marines conducted mock beach landings and air assault maneuvers in Rizal, a small town in western Palawan province in the Philippines, which does indeed face the South China Sea.

“A whole lot of damage can be done to Australia before any potential adversary sets foot on our shores, and maintaining the rules-based order in Southeast Asia, maintaining the collective security of Southeast Asia, is fundamental to maintaining the national security of our country,” said Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles of the joint military drills.

Like AUKUS itself, those war games were intended to send a message: China beware. The resources of the South China Sea aren’t for the taking.

It’s not just about energy

But here’s a question to consider: Is all this international saber-rattling only about fossil fuels?

Well-used shipping routes through the area are vital to the Chinese economy andt o the flow of goods globally. Further, the South China Sea’s fisheries account for 15% of the reported global wild fish catch. Yet trade nor fisheries fully explain the ever-heightening controversy over the region.

Having exploited that sea’s wild fisheries for decades, China is now becoming a global leader in fish farming, which already accounts for 72% of the country’s domestic fish production, Fossil fuels are also gradually being phased out. But is it possible that another set of natural resources, arguably more crucial to the economic future of the global superpowers, could be adding to the growing territorial furor over who possesses the goods in the South China Sea?

The answer is mining. You could call it a race to the bottom, with China leading the pack. In December 2022, China unveiled the Ocean Drilling Ship, a deep sea mining vessel, the size of a battle cruiser, set to be operational by 2024. Instead of weaponry, the ship is equipped with advanced excavation equipment capable of drilling at depths of 32,000 feet.

On land, the Chinese already hold a virtual monopoly on metals considered vital to “green” energy development, including cobalt, copper and lithium. Currently, the Chinese control 60% of the world’s supply of such “green” metals and are now eyeing the abundant resources that exist beneath the ocean’s floor as well. By some estimates, that seabed could contain 1,000 times more rare earth elements than those below dry ground.

It’s difficult to believe that devastating the ocean’s depths in search of minerals for electric batteries and other technologies would offer a sustainable way to fend off climate change. In the process, after all, such undersea mining is likely to have a catastrophic impact, including the destruction of biodiversity. Right now, it’s impossible to gauge just what sort of damage will be inflicted by the operations, since deep-sea mining is exempt from environmental impact assessments. (How convenient for those who will argue about how crucial they will be to producing a greener, more sustainable future.)

The UN’s High Seas Treaty, ratified in March 2023, failed to include environmental rules regulating such practices after China blocked any discussion of a possible moratorium on seabed harvesting. As of 2022, China holds five exploration contracts, issued by the UN’s International Seabed Authority (ISA), which allow the Chinese to conduct tests and sample contents on the ocean floor. While the UN body can divvy up such contracts, they have no power to regulate the industry itself, nor the personnel to do so. This has scientists worried that unfettered deep-sea mining could cause irreparable damage, including killing sea creatures and destroying delicate habitats.

“We’ve only scratched the surface of understanding the deep ocean,” said Dr. Andrew Chin, a scientific adviser to the Australian-based Save Our Seas Foundation.

Science is just starting to appreciate that the deep sea is not an empty void but is brimming with wonderful and unique life forms. Deep sea ecosystems form an interconnected realm with mid and surface waters through the movement of species, energy flows, and currents. Not only will the nodule mining result in the loss of these species and damage deep sea beds for thousands of years, it will potentially result in negative consequences for the rest of the ocean and the people who depend on its health.

Others are concerned that the ISA, even if it had the authority to regulate the budding industry, wouldn’t do it all that well. “Not only does the ISA favor the interests of mining companies over the advice of scientists, but its processes for EIA [environmental impact assessment] approvals are questionable,” says Dr. Helen Rosenbaum of the Deep-Sea Mining Campaign.

This brings us back to the South China Sea, which, according to Chinese researchers, holds large reserves of “strategically important” precious metals. China has already been fervently scouting for deposits of the polymetallic nodules that hold a number of metals used in virtually all green technologies.

“Learning the distribution of polymetallic nodules will help us to choose a site for experimenting with collection, which is one of the main goals of the mission,” said Wu Changbin, general commander of the Jiaolong, a submarine that discovered just such polymetallic nodules in the South China Sea.

Unsurprisingly, the US, lagging behind China in acquiring minerals for green technologies, has been keeping close tabs on the competition. In 2017, a Navy P3-Orion spy plane conducted repeated flyovers of a Chinese research vessel near the island of Guam. Scientists on the ship were allegedly mapping the area and planting monitoring devices for future deep-sea exploration.

The story is much the same in the South China Sea, where the US has conducted numerous surveillance operations to follow Chinese activities there. In May, an Air Force RC-135 surveillance plane was intercepted by a Chinese J-16 jet fighter, causing an international uproar. Without providing any justification for why a US spy plane was there in the first place, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken quickly pointed the finger at China’s recklessness. The “Chinese pilot took dangerous action in approaching the plane very, very closely,” claimed Blinken. “There have been a series of these actions directed not just at us, but in other countries in recent months.”

While these quarrels no doubt have much to do with control over fossil fuels, oil and natural gas aren’t the only resources in the region that are vital to the forthcoming exploits of both countries.

Capitalism and the climate

Across the globe, oil and coal are increasingly becoming things of the past. A report released in June 2023 by the International Energy Agency suggested that renewables were “set to soar by 107 gigawatts (GW), the largest absolute increase ever, to more than 440 GW in 2023.” The natural resources supplying this global surge in renewables, like copper and lithium, are becoming the popular new version of fossil fuels. Markets are favoring the phase-out of climate-warming energy sources. That’s why China and the United States are forging ahead with mining critical minerals for renewables — not because they care about the future of the planet, but because green energy is becoming profitable.

China’s foray into the global capitalist system and the ruins left in its wake are easy enough to track. In the late 1970s, China’s leaders liberalized the country’s markets and opened the floodgates on foreign investment, making China —  at an average clip of 9.5% per year — one of the fastest-growing economies ever. The World Bank described China’s financial boom as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.” It’s no surprise, then, that energy consumption exploded along with its economic gains.

Like many of its global competitors, China’s economy still relies heavily on carbon-intensive fossil fuels, especially coal, but an ever-growing portion of its energy portfolio is made up of renewable energy. China’s mammoth manufacturing industry makes up the greater part of its energy demand. Coal is indeed still fueling that economic engine in a major way — China uses more coal than the rest of the world combined — but the country has also become a (if not the) world leader in renewables, investing an estimated $545 billion in new technologies in 2022 alone.

While China uses more energy than any other country, Americans consume significantly more than two times that of the Chinese on an individual basis (73,677 kilowatt-hours versus 28,072 as of 2023). And while the US uses more energy per person, it also gets less of its energy from renewables.

As of 2022, the US government estimated that only 13.1% of the country’s primary energy was produced through renewable sources. Even so, the energy transition in the US is happening and, while natural gas has largely replaced coal, renewables are making considerable inroads. Aiding this, the Inflation Reduction Act, signed into law by President Biden in early 2022, earmarked $430 billion in government investment and tax credits for green-energy development.

The World Economic Forum estimates that three billion tons of metals and fine minerals will be needed for the world’s energy transition if we are to reach zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 — and that number will undoubtedly only grow in the decades ahead. Of course, investors love to cash in, and the forthcoming explosion in the mining of green metals on land and in the world’s waters will surely be a windfall for Wall Street and its equivalents globally. BloombergNEF (BNEF), which covers global markets, claims that the demand for key metals and minerals for the energy transition will grow at least fivefold over the next 30 years, representing something like a $10 trillion opportunity. At stake is the mining of critical minerals like lithium and traditional metals like copper, which will be used in power generation, electrical grids, energy storage, and transportation.

“The energy transition could lead to a super-cycle for the metals and mining industry,” says Yuchen Huo, a mining analyst for BNEF. “This cycle will be driven by massive expansions in clean energy technologies, which would spur demand growth for both critical minerals and traditional metals.”

It should be no surprise, then, that countries like China and the United States are likely to battle (perhaps all too literally) over access to the finite natural resources vital to the world’s energy transition. Capitalism depends on it. From Africa to the South China Sea, nations are scouring the globe for new, profitable energy ventures. In the Pacific Ocean, which covers 30% of the Earth’s surface, the hunt for polymetallic nodules is prompting island governments to open their waters to excavation in a significant way. The Cook Islands has typically issued licenses to explore its nearby ocean’s depths. Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga have funded missions to investigate deposits in the Clarion Clipperton Zone, a 1.7 million-square-mile area stretching between the island of Kiribati and Mexico.

This deep sea “exploration frenzy is occurring in the absence of regulatory regimes or conservation areas to protect the unique and little-known ecosystems of the deep sea,” contends Dr. Rosenbaum of the Deep-Sea Mining Campaign. “The health and environmental impacts of deep-sea mining will be widespread … The sea is a dynamic and interconnected environment. The impacts of even a single mine will not be contained to the deep sea.”

According to those who want to mine our way out of the climate crisis, such highly sought-after metals and minerals will remain crucial to weaning the world off dirty fossil fuels. But count on one thing: they will come at a grave cost — not only geopolitically but environmentally, too. Perhaps nowhere will such impacts be felt more devastatingly than in the world’s fragile seas, including the South China Sea where major armed powers are already facing off in an unnerving fashion. The toll both on those waters and on the rest of us is still to be discovered.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Competition Over “Green” Mineral Wealth Is the Environment’s Newest Threat appeared first on Fair Observer.

Something to consider when reading/listening: If someone created a perfect VR simulation of yourself as a child, would you be happy for it to interact with your loved ones? 

I don’t like arguing with mummy. I can’t stand it, in fact. I win every time, but that’s not the point.

But she gives me this look. This pitying look. I can’t stand it.

I can’t stand arguing with mummy. But sometimes she leaves me no choice. “I am the real James,” I say. “You’re looking at me. I’m right here.”

On her next visit, we don’t mention the argument. We don’t mention the real James. We sit calmly, happily, and discuss all the ways I’m going to make her proud.

[Doe Wilmann first released this piece on his short story podcast, Meaningless Problems.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Short Story: “A Backup” appeared first on Fair Observer.

Does the Gita Advocate Violence?

It seems odd to think that Krishna would urge anyone to actually kill people. In the Gita, Krishna tells Arjuna to go ahead and fight, and persuades him that he would not actually be killing anyone, because they are all already dead, and ‘that which has the body’ is immortal. (Arjuna does not ask—if I am really not killing anyone when I kill them, why kill them at all?) Moreover, Arjuna is asked to fight his friends and relatives, people with whom he has grown up and people he cares about. Arjuna’s refusal to fight tells us that he is a sensitive human being who values life and cares for relationships.

The first (and obvious) response to this problem is to recapitulate the narrative context. In the backstory, there has been much injustice. Peace talks having failed, the only way to restore righteousness is to go to war. Arjuna has to fight his own family members—and this is also a way to illustrate that we must stand up for righteousness even if it means going against people who are dear to us. Another response to the problem is to think of the war as an allegory. Gandhi had such a point of view: he saw the war of the Mahabharata as the war going on in our selves between the forces of good and evil.

My own solution has been to look at what Krishna recommends when he speaks more broadly, and to look for his assessment of violence. What is the sleight of hand that allows Arjuna to fight in battle and yet follow an ideal path? Chapter 16, where Krishna describes divine and demonic natures, provides clues. Stanzas 16.1 to 16.3 are one unit:

śrībhagavānuvāca
abhayaṃ sattvasaṃśuddhirjñānayogavyavasthitiḥ |
dānaṃ damaśca yajñaśca svādhyāyastapa ārjavam || (16.1)

This translates to: Fearlessness, goodness, purity, steady with knowledge and yoga, charity, self-control and yajnas, self-study, austerity, uprightness…

ahiṃsā satyamakrodhastyāgaḥ śāntirapaiśunam |
dayā bhūteṣvaloluptvaṃ mārdavaṃ hrīracāpalam || (16.2)

This translates to: Non-violence, truth, lack of anger, renunciation, pacifism, non-slander, compassion for all living beings, absence of greed, gentleness, modesty, absence of fickleness…

tejaḥ kṣamā dhṛtiḥ śaucamadroho nātimānitā |

bhavanti saṃpadaṃ daivīmabhijātasya bhārata || (16.3)

This translates to: Radiance, endurance, courage, purity, non-betrayal, not too much pride—these are the assets/wealth of those who are born to a divine destiny.

It is clear from the above stanzas that the Gita considers non-violence divine, and violence, demonic. How, then, is it possible for Arjuna to be asked to go to war? Is he being asked to be demonic? Krishna spells out the duties of each varna, and says that kshatriyas do not flee in battle.

śauryaṃ tejo dhṛtirdākṣyaṃ yuddhe cāpyapalāyanam |

dānamīśvarabhāvaśca kṣātraṃ karma svabhāvajam || (18.43)

This translates to: Heroism, radiance, courage, skill, not fleeing in battle, charity, and the spirit of being in charge—these are the natural duties of kshatriyas. Arjuna is a kshatriya, a warrior, and participating in a war is his duty. However, he is also told how to participate in battle. The answer to this is throughout the Gita, in the idea of conducting one’s duty without attachment.

niyataṃ saṅgarahitamarāgadveṣataḥ kṛtam |

aphalaprepsunā karma yattatsāttvikamucyate || (18.23)

This translates to: The action that is controlled and detached, done without desire or hatred, with no wish for results, that is a sattvic action. An elaborate system of ‘gunas’ (qualities) is presented in the Gita. The material world is made of a combination of the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas. People’s characteristics depend on which guna is predominant in them—and everything from diet preferences to kinds of rituals and charity are governed by these gunas. Among the gunas, sattva leads to happiness. Krishna asks Arjuna to leave aside feelings of hatred and violence, to not seek the fruit of action, and to do his duty. These are sattvic according to Krishna’s own exposition, even though Arjuna was born in the kshatriya varna.

A reader may be troubled by these concerns and choose to reject the Gita entirely. However, considering the depth of wisdom and the range of ideas contained in the Gita, I believe, such a rejection would be a colossal loss. Especially because Krishna says that his message is not a commandment or decree.

NOT A DECREE

At a public forum, once, someone in the audience asked me if I thought Gita was authoritative, and if yes, how did I reconcile the statements about varna. I explained my reasoning, and finally added—if you think God gave us an authoritative Gita, did he also not also give us the intelligence to think? Reason has a respectable place in the Gita. There are many words for the mind in Indian conceptions—buddhi, chitta and manas are some of them. ‘Buddhi’ is typically associated with reason, the rational mind, and with commonsense. Gita also mentions samkhya, which is one of the schools of Indian philosophy. Stanza 2.39 first introduces the term ‘buddhi’ as part of ‘buddhi-yoga’.

eṣā te’bhihitā sāṅkhye buddhiryoge tvimāṃ śṛṇu |

buddhyā yukto yayā pārtha karmabandhaṃ prahāsyasi ||

This translates to: This is declared in samkhya to you. But listen to this, about buddhi-yoga, Arjuna: When you are joined with buddhi, you avoid the bondage of karma.

Here, the reader may jump to the conclusion that everything that has been said up until then refers to samkhya, and that now Krishna is about to impart something about the path of ‘buddhi-yoga’. A quick review of samkhya philosophy, however, reveals that it does not really seem to have much to do with explaining the nature of atman. Instead, it is a dualistic system that explains the material world as the result of the interaction of ‘purusha’ and ‘prakriti’—and this concept is, in fact, covered later in the Gita. Moreover, samkhya does not call for the presence of a divine entity, Ishvara, and that again seems at odds with the Gita. A simple way to understand the reference is that it could have been an early form of samkhya philosophy, or simply a more generic word that means ‘philosophy’, one which Arjuna would have studied. Understood this way, we are no longer caught up in the specifics of the reference. Instead, we begin to understand it as an official and formal system of philosophy or doctrine, and by contrast, ‘buddhi’ becomes an active application of Arjuna’s own intellect. This also works within the context of the next few stanzas, 2.42 to 2.46, in which Krishna speaks about the limitations of vedic information. This section ends with:

yāvānartha udapāne sarvataḥ saṃplutodake |

tāvānsarveṣu vedeṣu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ || (2.46)

This translates to: As much use there is for a well when water is plentiful everywhere; similarly, in all the vedas, for a brahmin who knows.

‘Vijānataḥ’ is also derived from ‘jñā’ (to know), and here, Krishna has pointed out the difference between samkhya and the application of one’s own mind, and Vedas and the person who already has knowledge. Simply put, Krishna is asking Arjuna to think for himself. Krishna then proceeds to talk instead about a focus on action without the desire for the results of actions. Those who think for themselves ought to figure out that the consequences and results are not in their control anyway.

DO AS YOU WISH

Finally, despite all of Krishna’s exhortations and recommendations, he gives Arjuna the choice to accept or reject them in 18.63—‘yathecchasi tathā kuru’ (do as you wish). The Gita is not a decree or a commandment.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Bhagavad Gita appeared first on Fair Observer.

Last year, people rose up in revolt against Iran’s mullahs. Iran’s notorious religious police arrested 22-year-old Jina (Mahsa) Amini for not wearing the hijab properly. She was beaten and later died after falling into a coma, triggering unprecedented nationwide protests against the Islamist regime that has been in power since 1979.

The slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (Woman, Life, Freedom) reverberated throughout Iran and gave the movement its name. Women came out in the thousands. Young men joined them too. The regime was caught on its heels.

Why Are Young People Protesting in Iran?

September 16 marks the first anniversary of Amini’s death and the popular uprising’s beginning. This is a good occasion to pose fundamental questions. What has transpired in the aftermath of Amini’s death? Has the popular uprising changed Iran? Has the Islamist regime weakened or has it managed to claw its way back?

Who are the protesters?

The Woman, Life, Freedom Revolution was not the expression of a unified political movement. Not everyone opposes the Islamist regime for the same reasons, and people from every imaginable political stripe took part. The opposition is divided, however, into two main camps, which we can identify as the “progressive” and the “reactionary” opposition.

In the progressive camp fall the various pro-democracy movements of Iran. This includes a wide sweep of ordinary people as well as politically active individuals and organizations ranging from liberal to socialist and secular to Islamist. These currents have popular bases in Iranian society, especially among middle and lower classes as well as the marginalized sections of society such as ethnic, religious and sexual minorities.

Pluralism Is the Only Way Forward for Iranian Democracy

These people typically express their demands through street demonstrations and intend to establish a political system that accounts for liberal democracy, representative rule, ethnic and cultural diversity and decentralization and circulation of power.

The reactionary camp, on the other hand, is authoritarian. It is composed largely of the Pahlavists, who claim to represent the political legacy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran as a monarch, or Shah, from 1941–1979, with Western backing. Although the Shah’s regime was pro-Western, it was by no means democratic. It asserted tight control over Iranian society while it enriched the Shah and his allies by selling oil abroad. The Shah sought to modernize the country by promoting secular customs without loosening his grip on power. This alienated many Iranians, precipitating the 1979 revolution that led to an Islamist takeover of the country under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Dirty Secrets About How Reza Shah Destroyed Iran

After the revolution, many of the Shah’s wealthy supporters fled to the United States. These émigrés now form an influential community on the American West Coast. Their informal leader is Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s heir. The group finds a platform for its views in a multimillion-dollar, overseas Persian-language media industry that keeps the memory of the “Good Ol’ Days” alive.

The monarchist old guard in LA and elsewhere, however, are not the ones who have been the most active in Iran’s recent unrest; these latter are the “Pahlavists.” They are mostly composed of people affiliated with the Islamic Republic, both inside and outside of Iran. These include members of the Revolutionary Guards (a military force, distinct from the army, tasked with defending the Islamic Republic and its hardline Shia ideology) and the security forces. They also include people who had formerly been supporters of the Islamist regime but now have ostensibly become supporters of Reza Pahlavi.

These types claim that the monarchy should be restored with Reza Pahlavi as the Shah. They harshly attack supporters of democracy in Iran. They exhibit reprehensible intolerance towards Arabs and Jews, as well as towards those with different social or cultural values. Their reactionary rhetoric advocates positions that even the classic monarchists in LA would not dare support.

In my opinion, and the opinion of many other pro-democracy analysts and activists, the Pahlavists’ main function is to push back against democratic aspirations and democracy activists on behalf of the regime. They pose as if they did not work to advance the regime’s agenda but acted within the boundaries of the opposition. In so doing, they hope to command legitimacy among the Iranian people and the international community. 

However, the Pahlavists can also have a secondary, more subtle function. Some of those who hold positions of power within the regime might hope to use the Pahlavists as a Plan B. That is, if the regime comes to a point of no return and is about to fall, those elites can utilize the Pahlavists to facilitate Reza Pahlavi’s ascension to the throne so that they can hold on to their privileges. That is to say, the Islamist elite could cling onto the legitimacy of the monarch, just as Spain’s Francoist elite did after the restoration of that country’s monarchy.

Reza Pahlavi is now in a similar position to that of Juan Carlos in the early 1970s, and there are obvious signs that at least parts of the Revolutionary Guards and the regime’s security apparatus promote him at the expense of democracy activists. Pahlavi himself has openly said that he is in touch with the Revolutionary Guards. He has even repeatedly proclaimed that anti-regime protesters must embrace the IRGC instead of fighting it and that the Guards should remain employed in positions of power after the fall of the Islamic Republic.

What is clear, then, is that the reactionary camp does not represent the demands of the ordinary people and those who want democracy, but the interests of power and wealth inside and outside of Iran.

The rise and fall of a revolution

The Woman, Life, Freedom Revolution at its peak had two major stages. I call the first the “real revolution.” At that stage, democracy was the central aspiration of the revolutionaries. Activists were focused on pulling down the entire system of the Islamic Republic, liberating women and empowering disadvantaged groups of people.

The revolution was a truly postmodern one, and its characteristics proved profoundly different from classic revolutions. Most important of all, it did not have individual or group leadership. Rather, its many leaders were scattered across the country and the world, but were closely connected horizontally via the Internet and local networks. The protestors used these channels to exchange ideas and plan demonstrations. They organized defense strategies as the regime launched a brutal crackdown. Different layers of society inside and outside of Iran coordinated with each other in order to confront the Islamic Republic and let the world know that Iranians wanted to establish democracy.

At this stage, the most progressive and egalitarian ideals were at the heart of the revolution. The emancipation of women was at the forefront, alongside the liberation of sexual minorities. Revolutionaries advocated pluralism, multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity. They aimed to transform Iran’s historically centralized power structure by devolving governance in Iran. They demanded the rule of law and civil and political rights, which would apply to all people equally, regardless of their origin and background. For these and many other reasons, the Woman, Life, Freedom Revolution might have been the most progressive revolution in the modern history of the world so far.

But this upswelling of revolutionary ideas was not to last. The initial stage of the revolution gave way to what I call the “fake revolution.” The Revolutionary Guards promoted the Pahlavists as a front organization and sought to bridle the democratic aspirations of the uprising and drive the popular revolution in an anti-democratic direction.

The Pahlavists attempted to impose a top-down dictatorial leadership on the diverse revolutionary people and groups. They abused — verbally and sometimes physically — Reza Pahlavi’s critics as “leftists” and “separatists.” Contrary to the pluralism and progressivism that characterized the authentic revolution, the Pahlavists propounded reactionary ideas like patriarchy, absolutist monarchy and extreme nationalism.

When their attempt to make a charismatic leader out of the playboy prince failed, the regime’s agents of influence, exploiting the mainstream Persian media overseas, pulled out all the stops to create a council of celebrities centered on Reza Pahlavi to lead the ongoing revolution. However, most of these people, including Reza Pahlavi himself, had neither an organic connection with the protesters in Iran nor the necessary experience and expertise to deal with a revolutionary situation. As a result, they were soon reduced to vitriolic infighting which led to the collapse of the celebrity council.

The Pahlavist pseudo-revolution failed to gain any traction. It succeeded only in sucking the life out of the authentic revolution. The marginalization of pro-democracy activists made protesters on the ground lose their motivation to demonstrate and to fight back against the regime. This bought the Islamic Republic enough time to make peace with its foreign adversaries, suppress most of the domestic protests and come back from the brink.

So what have we gained from this clash of ideas?

The Woman, Life, Freedom Revolution has significant strategic implications for the future. Most importantly, it has fully exposed the unbridgeable chasm between the libertarian and the authoritarian forces among opponents of the regime. Before the revolution, this gap was not fully exposed, as various trends only engaged in routine rhetorical battles. But the revolution forced everyone to stand up for their values and tested their conduct in the field of action. Pahlavists and reactionaries can no longer credibly pose as revolutionaries.

Although they have suffered a setback for now, on the timescale of history pro-democracy forces have a fair chance to determine the political future of Iran. The valuable experiences they gained during the revolution have enabled them to see the situation on the ground more clearly and brought them closer together despite their differences. Their strong support of each other in the face of the joint attacks by the regime and the Pahlavists shows that Iranian democracy activists have reached a level of maturity and inclusivity that would not have become possible without the revolution.

In the end, the future of Iran will be decided by the battle, not simply between the “opposition” and the “regime,” but between the supporters of democracy and the combined authoritarian forces of the Pahlavists and the Islamist regime.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Iran’s Mahsa Revolution One Year On appeared first on Fair Observer.

I’ve always been a dog lover — but always from afar. First, there was Muffet in Edmonton, a black energetic poodle owned by the landlady of a family friend. Then, there was Breezy, a gentle old dog owned by a stately older couple. There was Whisky, a big, long-haired dog at a holiday cottage in Banff. Later, in Calgary, there were Rex and Pom-Pom, a husky and a poodle, owned by school friends. And, more recently, Harry and Sabre and Jake. I could authentically sing my own (platonic) version of Willie Nelson’s hit: “To All the Dogs I’ve Loved Before.”

Decades later, my distant love affair continues. Every morning, I go out for a walk in New Delhi. In the summers, this tends to be very early. The sun is not up yet. In fact, not many people are up yet. Just me and a few dogs walking their humans.

I see them daily, so I’ve gotten to know them.

There goes Zig-Zag Dog. A beige Lab, he is all business. He has a very specific agenda. He starts at point A (stops, sniffs, pees), walks across the street to point B (stops, sniffs, pees), then crosses the street again to point C (stops, sniffs, pees) and then re-crosses the street to point D— and so on, for precisely 20 minutes. In another world, he would be a successful walking-tour guide, leading other dogs to seemingly insignificant but secretively choice smelling/peeing spots that only a local would know. He would have high ratings on TripAdvisor.

There goes Reluctant Dog. A black mixed-breed, he lags as far behind his walker as possible given the length of his leash. For him, 5:30 AM is too early. Perhaps any time is too early. Once upon a time, he pranced and pulled on his leash, eager to get out there and see the world. But now he’s seen it all. He is Zen. He does not need to take Sri Sri Ravi Shankar’s “Art of Living” course or attend vipassana. “If you insist, I’ll come with you for a walk,” he sagely says, “but only to keep you company.” He’d rather sit at home, under the air conditioner, near his water bowl, and do some family-watching.

There goes Friendly Dog. “Friendly” because the owner is a lovely friendly lady, and I transpose her character to the dog. After all, I’ve seen the old cartoon movie One Hundred and One Dalmatians and I know this is how it works; dogs take on the characteristics, if not the actual physical features, of their owners. Interestingly, a recent study from Michigan State University supported this well-known home truth that dogs and owners often have similar personalities. This dog is a lab and the owner is not. However, they both have a friendly and trustworthy look – one that says “I’d make a good friend.”

There goes French Dog. His reputation in the neighborhood is that he’s a French attack dog. Maybe he’s thought to be French because looks like the comic character Tin-Tin’s dog. Maybe he’s thought to be aggressive because such dogs were originally bred to be fighting dogs, General Patton owned one, and President Theodore Roosevelt’s bit an ambassador. But I feel French Dog is sadly misunderstood on both counts. He’s actually a white bull terrier — an English breed. And he seems to go about his own business in a gentle and orderly manner, not pulling on the leash, nor stubbornly lagging behind: so far, an upstanding member of the community.

There goes Top Dog. Her tail is always way up and even curved over her back. Experts say this shows that she is a dominant dog and confident of her position, which is interesting, given that she lives in the same house as French Dog. This gives credence to my theory that French Dog’s poor neighborhood reputation is ill-deserved, and he should be more appropriately named Under Dog. Top Dog also has a pompom on the end of her tail. Dominant, confident — and a diva.

Then, there goes My Dog. Her real name is Ruby. She’s a golden retriever. She’s the dog of good friends who live just five doors down. They’ve tried to train her, but to no avail; I believe that, in a previous life, Ruby helped Nietzsche develop his concept of the Free Spirit. And she senses that she and I are soulmates — both ruled by the heart, not the head. She’s always happy to see me. She jumps up on my legs and then rolls over so I can rub her tummy. My dog.

Always the bridesmaid, never the bride. Always the dog lover, never the owner. And yet there are advantages to not being the owner (as there are to not being the bride, but that’s another article). I don’t have any of the responsibilities. I don’t have to feed the dog, walk the dog, take it to the vet, stay up nights, clean up after it or limit my travels because of it. At the end of the day, I can leave it in great hands and go home. But there are times when I feel it would be nice to have my own dog. Like when I see the opening credits of Downton Abbey and I see Lord Grantham walking his dog Isis across the vast landscaped grounds towards the mansion. Or maybe it’s just the grounds and the mansion I’m hankering for.

Tonight, I visit Dodger, a beagle owned by a wonderful family nearby. I’ve known Dodger for many years. He was once a yappy and excitable pup. Now, he is pushing 14, has a myriad health issues (including seizures), is on strong medications (including steroids and insulin) and is partially blind. He walks slowly into the room, gives two yaps for old times’ sake, smells me out and then quietly sits next to me. I stroke him gently. I’ll be very sad when he passes away. I can only imagine how his own family will feel. 

As I leave, I hear him say, “There goes Whatchamacallit Human. Disorganized. Trusting. Fuzzy logic. Panglossian. Was probably a dog in her last lifetime. Glad she came to play again, but glad she’s not staying. Too much work!”

In memory of Dodger, who passed away last month.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post A Beautiful Reflection: “To All The Dogs I’ve Loved Before” appeared first on Fair Observer.

I make no apology for reviving a headline that I first used two decades ago when I was on a panel on emerging markets with Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill. My argument then was that, although his coining of BRICs (as it then was) was a marketing masterstroke, he was, to adapt a biblical analogy, trying to make BRICs without straw when it came to substance.

Despite the addition of South Africa in 2010 and the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014 and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2015, BRICS lay becalmed for years. It has only really been energized by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The way in which the war has bolstered relations between the US and its allies in Europe and Asia has spurred Beijing to see BRICS as the best available vehicle to pull some middle powers more firmly into its orbit. As Steve Tsang of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, has noted:

What the Chinese are offering is an alternative world order for which autocrats can feel safe and secure in their own countries. They can find an alternative direction of development without having to accept the conditionalities imposed by the democratic Americans and European powers.

In its summit this August, BRICS invited six states to join the grouping on January 1, 2024. Among these are three Arab states: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.

What’s motivating the Arab states?

By any reasonable definition, all three countries qualify as autocracies. However, beyond this and the shared objective of closer economic ties with China as a counterweight to the US, they exhibit important differences in their motives.

For Egypt, it is a case of “cleft stick.” On the one hand, it has long been a top recipient of US aid. On the other, its reliance on the dollar has exacerbated the dire economic consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thanks to its dependency on imported energy and food. Foreign investors have withdrawn billions of dollars as the currency has crashed, the Gulf countries that provided support in the early days of the Sisi coup have lately imposed tougher conditions and a $3 billion loan from the IMF comes with stringent reform requirements. BRICS membership would facilitate trading with other members in local currencies and should help to attract more investment from them.

In contrast, although the UAE has benefitted enormously from Russian investment and has burgeoning trade relations with Russia, China and India (with which it has just finalized a deal to trade in local currencies), the main driver behind its BRICS application is political. It remains close with the US as far as security guarantees are concerned; but its confidence in US bankability has declined to the point where, as Vivian Nereim wrote in The New York Times last month, “Emirati leaders … fear a decline in American interest in the region — and the military defense that comes with it — and argue that Washington has not done enough to deter threats from Iran.” This dates back at least a decade, so joining BRICS would arguably be no more than the latest example of how, as Nereim notes, “a Middle Eastern leader viewed by the US government as an important partner,” Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, “is increasingly striking out on his own path.”

Saudi Arabia is, perhaps, the most interesting of the three. As has been well documented, relations between Washington and Riyadh have been rocky during the Biden presidency. Although they would improve significantly were Donald Trump to win the 2024 election, even this would be unlikely to reassure the Saudis over US security guarantees, particularly given Trump’s failure to act on the 2019 attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. Hence, Riyadh’s openness to Beijing-brokered rapprochement with Tehran earlier this year which has helped open the BRICS door for both the kingdom and Iran.

Nevertheless, in the margins of the BRICS summit the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, claimed that his country was not committed to joining BRICS before it had had time to consider the terms. As there are no laid-down criteria for membership beyond unanimous agreement among existing members, this is, in itself, sensible. However, it may also mean that Riyadh is using the prospect of BRICS membership as leverage to try to extract more concessions from Washington in their talks over a grand bargain sweeping in the kingdom’s civil nuclear aspirations, arms sales and relations with Israel.

Middle East expert Bruce Riedel (quoted in The Guardian on July 27) is correct that Riyadh is unlikely to want to give Biden an election boost if he could get both the Netanyahu government and the US Senate on board too. However, from a Saudi perspective, there is no downside to testing the waters. Especially since, as Gideon Rachman opined in Financial Times on September 4 (and Jon Hoffman made the same point even more forcefully in Arab Digest’s September 6 podcast), even if a grand bargain were to be struck, it would likely “turn out to be a grand illusion” for Washington.

China is not as available as it seems

All this being said, the biggest illusion of all may be the belief among BRICS candidates that membership would be a major boon to economic ties with China. As I wrote in the Arab Digest’s April 20 newsletter, Beijing is struggling with its own economic headwinds. Furthermore, its dominant role at the BRICS summit notwithstanding, China has been turning increasingly inwards since Xi Jinping first started his drive for self-sufficiency in the overarching quest to sustain in perpetuity the CCP’s grip on power. Beijing’s principal aim in its promotion of BRICS is therefore to work with other autocracies in promoting its governance model internationally, the better to defend it domestically.

None of this is to say that BRICS is doomed to fail. As Oliver Stuenkel opined in a recent essay in The Economist, “the BRICS grouping is here to stay.” Nevertheless:

BRICS expansion … would not be a sign of the group’s growing diplomatic clout — quite the opposite, in fact, since finding a common denominator would become more difficult. Expansion would, rather, be a reflection of China’s growing influence when defining the future of the bloc.

From the perspective of the three Arab aspirants, it is therefore worth reflecting carefully if membership could all too easily turn out to be a Faustian pact.

[Arab Digest first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post BRICS Without Straw: What Does China Offer to New Members? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Hoshang Billimoria remembers the time when he began as a young auditor. During those days, auditors were poorly paid and auditing standards were low. Yet Billimoria returned to India to begin life as an auditor. A chance meeting with Minoo Mody, the chief executive of Tata Sons, allowed him to make the transition from audit to general management.

A trip down the Tata memory lane

Billimoria remembers meeting the late Jehangir Ratanji Dadabhoy Tata, known popularly as JRD, whom he calls a “magnetic personality.” As per Billimoria, JRD oozed charisma, put you at ease and impressed you with his humility. JRD was able to enthuse people, who then gave their best.

(The only person who compares to JRD today is Deepak Parekh, who lets grass grow under his feet. His achievements with HDFC Bank are extraordinary. He has created an empire in a “stunning” career and Parekh does not get due credit for what he has done.)

JRD had a knack for identifying and supporting talent. Russi Mody of Tata Steel, Darbari Seth of Tata Chemicals and Ajit Kerkar of Indian Hotels are three examples of talented managers JRD selected. All three were entrepreneurs and great managers.

Russi Mody’s genius lay in human resources. Billimoria recollects a story of Russi saying hello to a new driver and then recognizing him when he visited Bombay the next time. Seth used to write a letter to Billimoria when financial results came out and Kerkar was on his board. These characters were professionally top-notch.

In those days, the licenses and approvals required to do business were innumerable. India’s colonial rent-seeking and parasitic bureaucracy made life extremely difficult for India’s business leaders. To make matters worse, corruption seemed to come from above lower levels and a diabolical black economy. Bureaucrat flunkeys sitting in a crumbling office controlled both managerial remuneration and managerial appointments.

During such a torrid time, JRD and his team rose up to the challenge. Seth made money from the soda ash plants in Gujarat and bought tea gardens in Assam. He was extraordinarily entrepreneurial. Kerkar was uniquely suited for the hotel business. He understood hospitality extremely well.

JRD’s personal integrity was unimpeachable. Even Dhirubhai Ambai, arguably India’s greatest entrepreneur, had great respect for JRD. When Billimoria met JRD, the legendary business leader asked Billimoria about his career, his education, his family and why he did not settle down in the UK. Billimoria gave the truthful answer that he had only returned to India because of his parents. He left after meeting JRD with a sense of happiness, satisfaction and a great deal of respect. JRD had inspired Billimoria to work for him.

The Tata story after 1991

The Tata Group was long-established, solid and very strong. So, foreign companies coming to India wanted to tie up with the Tatas, and 1991 turned out to be very good for the Tata Group. There was no shortage of opportunities. Sony first came to Tata when they entered the Indian market.

The only criticism that one can make of JRD is that he should have handed over the reins five years earlier. Every major manager thought of himself as the best qualified to take over, and a struggle for succession ensued. Billimoria remembers the post-1991 period as “a difficult time” with this struggle causing friction within the company.

Billimoria began as the deputy CEO of Tata Sons but was given charge of Tata Press in 1990. Management’s relationship with labor was very poor at the time. In one incident, the union locked the senior management into a conference room. Billmoria was able to get through to his chairman Jamshed Bhabha, the brother of the legendary nuclear scientist Homi Jehangir Bhabha, who summoned the police. The fractious situation only calmed down when the police threatened to open fire.

Billimoria sacked the union leader, who turned out to be a coward. Soon after, the tide turned and the Tata Press prospered. Billimoria had a glorious 14 years in charge. Tata Press published the Yellow Pages, children’s books and niche magazines that cover cars, travel et al. An arbitrary legislative change made print expansion impossible. So, Tata Press went into audiovisual production, but the foray into Bollywood was an unmitigated disaster. The movie business turned out to be dodgy.

McKinsey came in and identified Tata Press as a non-core company. It was put up for sale. ICICI Ventures bought Tata Press, and Billimoria left in three months. ICICI Ventures engaged in asset-stripping. Its focus was on the real estate owned by Tata Press, not on the underlying business. The company was run down to the bone, and Billimoria left to start a new company, backed by Shapoorji Pallonji Group and HDFC. Over 150 people joined this new venture, and the company still exists today after 20 years, even though Billimoria has retired.

[Matthew Knudson produced this podcast.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Rare Personal Memories of JRD Tata and Life in Business appeared first on Fair Observer.

On September 4, 2021, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, landed in newly Taliban-occupied Kabul. With a beaming smile, he faced the camera of a weary journalist who had asked what was next and stated, “Don’t worry, everything will be okay.” Hameed’s jubilance and optimism were understandable; the group the ISI had fostered, trained, funded and stood behind through two decades of insurmountable odds had just achieved the inconceivable feat of an almost completely bloodless takeover of Afghanistan.

The grand dream of General Zia-ul-Haq, architect of Pakistan’s insurgent strategy, that Pakistan achieve geopolitical dominance in South Asia by facilitating domestic and international jihadist groups never seemed more in focus.

Now using its newfound ally’s resources, Pakistan could set its security problems to rest. The Taliban had adept combat capabilities and resilient pipeline of fighters from madrasas. They also carried the credibility based on their status as a Pashtun and Islamic group.

Pakistan placed its hopes in the ability of the Afghan Taliban to broker peace between Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. The Taliban could further assist in fighting Islamic State — Khorasan Province and militant groups in Balochistan and, ultimately, continue its “Global Jihad” in Jammu and Kashmir.

Yet, the dream has been cut short by a rude awakening. The ISI has instead seen its assets tied up in a revitalized TTP insurgency, major expansion in ISIS-K operations, continued Baloch militancy and new border clashes with Afghanistan.

The Taliban haven’t been Pakistan’s geopolitical silver bullet; they may become one of its greatest existential challenges. Not only does Taliban-controlled Afghanistan pose new challenges to Pakistan’s security establishment, but it directly challenges Pakistan’s territorial integrity by igniting clashes at its border, inspiring insurgency in border provinces and sheltering new security vacuums Pakistan must fill or combat.

The Taliban had already planned their next steps for Global Jihad: pressure the Durand Line border from within Pakistan and from Afghanistan, establish shadow control over border areas and ultimately erase the Durand Line. Through this long-war strategy, the Taliban could expand Afghanistan and finally heal the scars of its colonial wars with the British Empire by regaining lands taken from the nation during the Anglo–Afghan Wars, taking on the mantle of the heroes of the Pashtun people and the saviors of South Asia.

The saviors of South Asia?

In the midst of the Afghan Civil War, Mullah Mohammed Omar founded the Taliban to address issues in their immediate surroundings in Kandahar. It is unknown if Omar and his group of extremist Deobandi Islamic militant scholars saw the future of the Taliban’s exploits then, but their early success certainly prepared the way for a truly meteoric rise. From the Taliban’s very first successful operation against two pedophilic warlords in Kandahar, they won the hearts and minds of locals for their ability to bring stability and maintain credibility.

It was at this early stage in the group’s operations that a sort of “Taliban Promise” was formed. The group could take control of territory with use of insurgent and guerilla ground tactics in storm-type attacks and defend the territory through its ability to rapidly recruit new units. Then once in control, the Taliban would govern through a mix of Deobandi Islamic principles — adherence to extreme literalist fundamental Islam with specific belief in declaring apostasy — and Pashtun ethnic principles — honor, reciprocity and tribal courts.

Both aspects of the Taliban’s initial Afghan campaign fed into one another, and their identification as Muslim and Pashtun gave them legitimacy and access to fighters while continued territorial control and battlefield success gave their rule legitimacy. This Taliban Promise wasn’t glamorous, but it was something Afghans could predict, expect, understand to some extent and accept as the alternative was being at the whims of a vagrant warlord.

Thus, the Taliban set out from Kandahar, reversing the impending balkanization of Afghanistan, destroying fiefdoms and maintaining a common link to most Afghans through religious and ethnic values. The Taliban’s movement likewise stood in stark contrast to Pakistan’s then main ally, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (not a difficult feat, as he was best known for shelling residential neighborhoods in Kabul, earning him the title “Gulbuddin Rocket-yar”). With no real competitors and an incredibly successful domestic campaign, the group became the de facto future rulers of Afghanistan, gaining Pakistan’s full support by 1994 and even earning financial assistance from the US in early 2001.

It was only when the Taliban was implicated in the events of 9/11 that the international community’s hope for its success faded. With the façade revealed and the Taliban’s links to international terror organizations like al-Qaeda plain to see, almost all of the group’s bridges with the international community were burned. Then, with the US invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Taliban government, it seemed the Taliban’s fate was sealed. With no ability to fight against the US military in a head-to-head conflict, Taliban leadership quickly withdrew across the Durand Line to Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal lands.

Pakistan could never let the Taliban fail. The nation had abandoned its previous allies for the Taliban and, therefore, this was Pakistan’s last real chance at creating an insurgent movement to dominate South Asia. Too much had been invested in the Taliban to let them be destroyed by the US military. So, while the US was establishing supply lines through Pakistan for its invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI began providing the Taliban arms, logistics, intelligence and shelter to ensure their survival.

Double games, double problems

The Pakistani intelligence and security community would not abandon its master plan to fulfill General Zia’s goal of creating and controlling the world’s preeminent insurgent paramilitary group for the domination of South Asia. These were the cards Pakistan had played for over 20 years to this point, and changing strategies was not under discussion. The foundational moves for Pakistan were too consequential to even consider looking back. 

General Zia’s 1979 decision to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by funneling international funds specifically into extremist Islam had opened Pandora’s box. Partnering with extremist Abdullah Azzam, the architect of the Global Jihad, created the current pipeline of militants, and dismantling it would be immensely difficult. This was the original “double game” Pakistan had created during the Soviet–Afghan War, supporting US interests by supporting counter-Soviet religious militants in Afghanistan but ultimately damaging US interests by instrumentalizing those militants.

Pakistan’s plan, however, does not seem to have been specifically directed at damaging US national security. The intention was, and always has been, to open the door to extremist militant Islam while directing its violence against Pakistan’s immediate national security concerns. Pakistan would become the champion of Islam in South Asia and lead the Global Jihad against the region’s greatest threat: rival India — Hindustan.

Islamabad’s double game therefore could not end with the US invasion of Afghanistan; it just became more dangerous. The ISI had to directly oppose the US by aiding the Taliban while also maintaining outward support for the US and facilitating its military operations. The stakes were never higher, but in 2021, with the Taliban yet again in control of Kabul and the US still not explicitly pursuing action against Pakistan for its role, it looked as if the double game had been won.

Pakistan’s double game, however, has only created double the problems. Today, the nation remains ensnared by daily insurgent violence and political turmoil, all under the dark cloud of devastating natural disasters. The Taliban have not proven to be the magnanimous allies Pakistan had hoped for, and Pakistan’s problems have only grown as a result of its costly partnership with them.

A stark reminder of the enmity now between the two allies is the Torkham Border Crossing clash seen in February. Pakistani Frontier Corps and Afghan Taliban troops opened fire, wounding one member of the corps and prompting a swift Pakistani diplomatic response to ease tensions.

The documented gunfights between the two militaries in broad daylight at their busiest crossing, however, do not encompass the entirety of their negative interactions. Clashes have died down since February, but smaller interactions like explosions at border points, explosives and drug seizures and illegal crossings still show the Taliban’s continued destabilizing effect on Pakistan.

The Taliban’s active clashes with Pakistan are not even the largest destabilizing factor. The group’s takeover of Afghanistan has proven far more problematic to security because it has given modern insurgency a proof of concept. Insurgents in South Asia and beyond may feel they don’t have to settle for a seat at the table, because if they wait long enough they may own the whole restaurant just as the Taliban seized Afghanistan.

The TTP is the greatest example of this new insurgent impetus. Emboldened by the Afghan Taliban’s victories, it has taken to a new campaign of violence against Pakistani forces and civilians. With no war in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters likewise gain a new purpose and can easily move through Pashtun tribal networks to join a new battlefield.

Pakistan attempted to execute its strategy of controlling the Taliban when it entered into Afghan Taliban-negotiated talks with the TTP, but this quickly failed. Negotiations between the two sides broke down after only a few rounds of talks; Pakistan assassinated TTP core leadership, decisively ending the rapproachment, and violence has trended upward since. Now, one need look no further than the front page of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations or the TTP’s propaganda websites to see that clashes between Pakistan and the TTP have become a daily occurrence.

Likewise, the drumbeat of attacks by Baloch militant groups like the Baloch Liberation Army, the Balochistan Liberation Front and the Baloch Nationalist Army has only increased. These groups have also become emboldened by the Taliban’s advances and now conduct gruesome attacks specifically targeting Chinese nationals, like in the Karachi University bombing, and broader regional critical infrastructure.

This turn of events has proven that although the Taliban are a byproduct of long-term Pakistani national security and intelligence decision-making, the Taliban do not feel they are beholden to Pakistan. Although the ISI sheltered the Taliban from the US, the Taliban are still a grassroots ethno-religious militant movement with its own goals that now challenge Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

With Afghanistan firmly in the Taliban’s grasp, a new double game is beginning in South Asia: a double game that seeks to rewrite the history of British colonial rule.

The New Fight for the Durand Line

Pakistan’s strategy to gain a stronger position in South Asia by supporting militant extremism has turned out to be quite flawed. While it was possible to steer the Mujahideen’s Global Jihad during the Soviet–Afghan War, it does not seem equally possible to direct the Taliban. The success of Pakistan’s strategy of directing militancy during the Soviet–Afghan War was largely due to the Mujahideen being a specifically Islamist militant movement; the interests of both Pakistan and the militants were mostly aligned. However, the Taliban is a hybrid organization that represents both extremist Islam and Pashtun nationalism; as a result, many of the Taliban’s interests run entirely contrary to Pakistan’s. Erasing the Durand Line and retaking the Pashtun land taken from Afghanistan by the British is the largest of these differing interests.

The Durand Line was drawn in 1893 by the British Empire to better administer Afghanistan after its Pyrrhic conquest during the Second Anglo–Afghan War (1878–1880). Learning from the British army’s absolute decimation at the hands of Pashtun tribal alliances during the First Anglo–Afghan War (1838–1842), colonial Britain was unwilling to invest too heavily in Afghanistan and sought a strategy that would instead defang the nation.

Abdur Rahman Khan was installed as shah by the British in 1880, allowing him to lead a violent domestic campaign to gain undisputed control of Afghanistan from the powerful Pashtun tribal networks. Then, once the Pashtun tribes had been cowed, it was necessary to permanently debilitate them so their tribal alliances could never rise again to challenge Afghanistan or British India.

Pashtunistan was cut in two by the Durand Line, dividing the lands governed by the Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and British India. Then, with tribal networks separated by administrative and political borders, there was no way for them to form a cohesive military organization to threaten British control of South Asia again as they once did in the First Anglo–Afghan War. Furthermore, subjugating and ruling over fractured tribal networks allowed both Abdur Rahman Khan and the British to maintain a high degree of regional autonomy without consulting domestic power brokers.

The British Empire’s scar on Afghanistan was challenged during the Third Anglo–Afghan War (1919), but ultimately maintained when Afghanistan gained independence. When Pakistan was created in 1947, the border was retained and it has lasted ever since.

The Durand Line served a significant strategic purpose during the Soviet–Afghan War, the Afghan Civil War and US–Afghan War which followed. The political boundary allowed combatants in Afghanistan to easily retreat and regroup into Pakistan when in danger and launch sorties from a safer position than from within Afghanistan. Yet, with no current foreign invading force in Afghanistan, Afghan militants no longer have a need for the border.

Militant Deobandi Islam has proven to be the potion Pashtun nationalism needed to revive itself, and now the Taliban are emerging as the champions of Pashtunistan as an entity. Likewise, the Taliban have good reason to reunite Pashtunistan and erase the Durand Line, as doing so would provide them immense domestic and regional legitimacy, potentially cementing their rule.

Gheyrat and izat, the Afghan concept of honor, run deep through the nation’s history and future. Invasion after invasion has instilled within our storied nation a ceaseless, brave resilience to cruelty in the face of insurmountable odds.

Just as all nations who foray into the Graveyard of Empires do, Pakistan is learning this lesson from the inside out. This all converges on the faultline of their shared scar of British colonial rule — the Durand Line — with a promise to restore Afghanistan’s honor at the price of accepting an extreme Deobandi, kleptocratic military state.

Pakistan’s territorial integrity is facing its first true challenge: The Taliban are increasing their influence and violence at an alarming rate, and insurgents are inching ever closer to nuclear capabilities, all as we peer from over the horizon.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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In her newsletter last Wednesday, Caitlin Johnstone focused on reporting about new military technology that appeared in the British billionaire-owned newspaper The Telegraph. In its title the author extols the merits of a “war-winning swarm missile” that “will knock China out of Taiwan — fast.”

The title of Johnstone’s piece — “Think Tanks Are Information Laundering Ops For War Profiteers” —

highlights, in her usual down-to-earth muckraking style, the points to a flagrant and systemic conflict of interest, that deserves examination.

The configuration of actors is clear. On one side we find the defense contractors (the “war profiteers,” major players at the core of the military-industrial complex). On another is the “billionaire-owned newspaper” that publishes the article. And in the strategic middle lies a “think tank” that provides not just the copy but the supposed intellectual legitimacy of the story. Together, they work as a skilled trio acting out a well-rehearsed scenario in the interest of a US foreign policy that has clearly taken on the character of a new Cold War.

Johnstone specifically targets the author of the article, David Axe, a US military correspondent for Forbes, whose body of work she has tracked over the years. Though he published a graphic novel with the title, War is Boring, Axe has consistently demonstrated his deep commitment to the excitement of war. Johnstone doesn’t hesitate to characterize him as a seasoned “war propagandist.” She describes his piece in The Telegraph as a “covert advertorial for Lockheed Martin’s JASSM missile.”

To make her case, she reveals a relevant fact about the source of the story. It is entirely based on a study conveniently provided “by the military industrial complex-funded think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).” Allowing herself a note of Captain Renault-style irony,  Johnstone claims that readers will “be shocked and astonished and surprised and stunned to learn” that the Think Tank “lists the Lockheed Martin Corporation as one of its top donors.”

Johnstone’s description unveils for the unsuspecting reader a highly efficient, well-funded but largely invisible system conducted by a star-studded cast of top-level performers. It includes Washington politicians in the White House and Congress, the Pentagon’s sprawling bureaucracy, the powerful, monopolistic defense contractors and their army of lobbyists, the intelligence community and the indispensable think tanks that craft the narrative that will be confided to dutiful journalists such as David Axe.

Today’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition, authored by Caitlin Johnstone:

Think tank:

An institution in which scholars are paid by the rich and powerful to think up reasons why it would be good and smart to do something evil and stupid.

Contextual note

Some may say that Johnstone is unfairly picking on an author who, in his publications, has demonstrated seriously detailed knowledge of all kinds of weaponry and takes a keen interest in the effects they produce. In his journalism, Axe has shown little interest in the logic of war itself. Does his passion for weapons and his skill at describing their performance justify Johnstone’s calling him “a war propagandist?”

A glance at some of his descriptions of war, even in the context of War is Boring, helps to justify this accusation. In a flattering C-SPAN interview in 2010 promoting the  graphic novel, he explained his feeling that “if war is boring then peace is way worse.” In the book, he makes it clear that he didn’t appreciate the dull moments of waiting around when nothing much is going on the battlefield. He seems to accept boredom as a casualty of war. In his own words, he relishes those “golden nuggets of excitement and the tiny little gems of a good story.”

Like most true war propagandists, Axe is sensitive to what war means for the US economy and the capacity of an empire to manage the world’s resources. When describing the war in the Congo, which he calls “the worst war Americans don’t know anything about,” he explains — presumably to justify the US military presence there — that Congo is “a country that really matters to the developed world” as “a source of much of the world’s rare earth minerals.” To clarify his meaning, he adds: “Without Congo, we wouldn’t have this high tech society we have.”

Axe concludes that his graphic novel on war in the Congo is aimed at getting Americans to feel more involved in that war. Whether that commitment to military action makes him a war propagandist, he seems to have assimilated the same imperialistic attitude that Elon Musk demonstrated concerning Bolivia’s lithium when he tweeted: “We will coup whoever we want! Deal with it.”

In another interview about War is Boring, Axe boldly claims that he and the illustrator of his book do “not serve advertisers in the defense industry, and we also have imaginations and integrity. We know who we work for — our readers, not the government. Not the arms industry.” One is left wondering, given the connections Johnstone reveals, whether this isn’t his way of admitting that it’s in his journalism, rather than as the author of books, that he serves the arms industry. What is clear is that Axe believes deeply in the vocation of the US military to serve the needs of the corporations who have provided us with “this high tech society we have.”

Historical note

The concept of think tanks can be traced back to the Progressive Era in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The obscene prosperity of the Gilded Age induced the wisest strategists of capitalist success to find ostensible ways of demonstrating that “filthy lucre” could serve social and not just personal or commercial ends.

The emerging age of Public Relations (PR) reached maturity in the 1920s under the intellectual leadership of Edward Bernays, the author of Propaganda (1928). Wealthy philanthropists began to see think tanks as worthy investments, designed to persuade an otherwise skeptical public of their commitment to harness the best and most objective human intelligence in the formulation of enlightened public policy. Think tanks could thus be counted on to propose “wise policies,” independent of, but decidedly not in conflict with their own interests.

The prestigious British think tank, Chatham House, claims that think tanks emerged “as ‘study groups’ which brought together academics and government officials to discuss policy issues within a confidential setting.” This innocuous description paints a picture of the nation’s “brightest” concerting with democratically elected officials to produce a Panglossian “best of all possible worlds.” The description carefully leaves out the third party in the initiative: the enterprises or wealthy individuals who funded them.

Quite logically, the Cold War turned out to be the golden age of think tanks. They provided the perfect model of the use of “human intelligence” to address the needs of an age dominated by ideological rivalry. Humanity entered the age of mass and indeed global propaganda. Despite the end of the Cold War three decades ago, that age has been artificially prolonged to this day.

We can attribute the persistence of a culture of propaganda quite simply to the enduring success of an economic model based on a permanently militarized economy. Never has so much wealth and power been concentrated in a system too densely and intricately structured to be disentangled by even the most thorough and creative human intelligence.  This has produced a widely shared belief system — a permanently militarized mindset — fostered by think tanks funded by those certain to benefit financially from a growing obsession with national security.

In her brief newsletter diatribe, Caitlin Johnstone schematically sketches the complete logic of a system that stretches across global finance to politics, engages the massively profitable defense industry and employs think tanks to elaborate a respectable-sounding rationale. And of course, at the other extreme, it generously feeds the media with seemingly objective information and assessment. I’m not describing a conspiracy. It is a cleverly engineered, well-oiled structure — complete with a convenient revolving door — that allows everyone to interact, often without even thinking about how their specific role connects with the system.

What better way to ensure that nobody — not even the “thinkers” in the tank or the journalists spreading the wisdom they produce — realizes that they are actively producing something “evil and stupid” while sharing the belief that it’s “good and smart?”

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of Fair Observer Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Protesters in Syria, Bahrain, Libya, Iran and Israel are dashing autocratic and authoritarian hopes of a prolonged winter.

In response, Arab autocrats are scrambling to squash what they fear could evolve into a third wave of protests in little more than a decade. The autocrats have deployed tools ranging from cracking down on street protests to increased repression to engaging in perfunctory dialogue. They’ve made concessions and economic aid to defuse exploding and potential future powder kegs.

The third wave of protests since the Arab Spring

The latest protests erupted after street agitation across the Middle East bookended the last decade.

In the early 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt relied on security force violence, military interventions and support for conservatives and rebel militias to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular revolts that toppled the long-standing autocratic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Uprisings erupted again in 2019 and 2020 in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan. A combination of autocratic political maneuvering and the Covid pandemic defanged them, often with devastating consequences.

Analysts, journalists and academics argued that counterrevolutionary measures had replaced the 2011 Arab Spring with a prolonged Arab Winter. The latest protests, however, suggest the winter’s snow may be melting.

This month, Iran braces for the September 16 first anniversary of Masha Amini’s death. Amini died under suspicious circumstances in the custody of Iran’s religious police, who detained her for allegedly wearing her headscarf loosely. Amini’s death sparked months of street protests in which security forces killed 530 people and arrested more than 22,000. Since then, popular defiance has turned businesses, cultural events, courthouses and religious ceremonies into protest and civil disobedience venues. “Wrong decisions may have painful consequences for the establishment. People cannot take more pressure. If it continues, we will witness street protests again,” a former government official warned.

Syria has seen almost two weeks of sustained mass anti-government protests in the Druze-populated southwest province of Suwayda, long a pro-government stronghold. The demands for the fall of President Bashar al-Assad are resonating in the neighboring Sunni region of Daraa and even Assad’s Alawite stronghold of Latakia. “Initially, Assad probably thought, ‘I have won and we can let this happen; we can let the Druze let off some steam.’ It turned out to be a mistake from the Assad point of view, and Assad’s military will have to keep him in power,” said Syria expert Joshua Landis.

Authorities in Bahrain have so far failed to end a widening, more than three-week-long hunger strike by 800 prisoners, or at least 20% of the Gulf state’s prison population, by acceding to some demands for improved incarceration conditions.

Libyan security forces were deployed this week on the streets of the capital, Tripoli, to prevent renewed protests against a meeting between since dismissed Foreign Minister Najla al-Mangoush and her Israeli counterpart, Eli Cohen. The protests heaped pressure on Libya’s internationally recognized interim national unity government to step down and make way for a new administration.

Similarly to Iran, Israel has been rocked by nine months of protests — even if Israeli pro-democracy demonstrations have focused on opposition to Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s judicial reforms, with no reference to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

In Iraq, Arab and Turkmen protesters opposed to a Kurdish political presence in the disputed multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk clashed with Kurds this weekend, suggesting Iraq could rejoin the list of Middle Eastern countries experiencing social unrest. Authorities initially imposed a curfew in Kirkuk after four people were killed in the protests.

Could Egypt be next?

Supporters of President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, including the UAE, worry Egypt could be the next to witness a renewed wave of protests.

“There’s a feeling people aren’t comfortable with anything right now. There’s a debt crisis, prices of everything and inflation have gone up dramatically. People’s lives and situations go from bad to worse. Their willingness to stay quiet has disappeared. You’re more likely to hear about the discontent openly in the streets,” Egyptian-Canadian journalist Karim Zidan said to me days after he arrived in Cairo for a visit last month.

In an article entitled “Egypt’s Sisi Rules by Fear—and Is Ruled by It,” Egypt expert Steven A. Cook added, “There is a large, growing, and noticeable divergence between what the government promises Egyptians and how they experience everyday life.”

Fear of renewed protests in Egypt, set to become the world’s largest importer of wheat for the fiscal year 2023–2024, was likely one reason why the Abu Dhabi Export Office and UAE-based agribusiness Al Dahra last month agreed to provide Egypt for the next five years with $100 million a year worth of imported milled wheat “at competitive prices.”

Fear of unrest drives harsh repression

The fear of protests, even in countries like Saudi Arabia with a low risk of discontent spilling into the streets, may also explain out-of-proportion repressive measures like the kingdom’s recent sentencing to death of Muhammad al-Ghamdi, a 54-year-old teacher and brother of a dissident Islamist scholar, for his activity on X, formerly known as Twitter.

Human Rights Watch said the two X accounts associated with al-Ghamdi and cited in court documents had only ten followers between them. Al-Ghamdi generally retweeted tweets by known critics of the Saudi government.

In a just-published book, author Robert D. Kaplan noted that Vladimir Lenin, a founder of the Soviet Union, understood “that it was necessary to murder and incarcerate the innocent. For how else could a dictator inculcate total fear in the population? To punish only the guilty would provide the innocent, who constitute most of the population, with peace of mind. And that, of course, would undermine the sort of control that Lenin believed was necessary.“

Kaplan’s analysis bears out in Iran’s response to protests and Israel’s West Bank and Gaza-related policies. Moreover, it doesn’t bode well for Syrian protesters. Even so, the analysis provides an explanation for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s unnecessarily harsh repression of any sign of dissent.

However, what protests in countries like Iran and Syria and powder kegs such as Egypt suggest, as did the 1989 anti-government demonstrations that sparked the demise of the Leninist empire, is that repression at best buys autocrats and authoritarians time. In the end, it doesn’t remove the risk of mounting discontent with social and economic policies spilling onto the streets.

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is gaining ground in opinion polls. The fears among the populace and economic turmoil caused by the war in Ukraine are partly to thank for this recent popularity, but so too are AfD’s years of efforts to infiltrate the backbone of Germany’s civil society: volunteer fire departments.

Part of Germany’s social beating heart

Germany has over 1.3 million firefighters, a substantial portion of the nation’s 84 million citizens. Of these, over a million are volunteers, along with an additional 270,000 junior firefighters. Germany is unique in this regard; in few other European nations do volunteers provide such a great share of fire protection.

Fire control in Germany would fall apart without the volunteer work of firefighters. Their activities extend beyond providing vital fire safety. Volunteer fire departments are the social beating heart of the nation, driving community life, especially in rural areas. For example, they organize fairs and other recreational events. In Germany, where around 40% of the population older than 14 commits to volunteerism, volunteer fire departments are a nationwide pillar of civic engagement.

Due to their deep-rootedness in German society, zealous conservative actors have cast an eye on volunteer fire departments to penetrate into the center of society. According to the former president of the German Fire Brigades Association, Hartmut Ziebs, 10,000 extremists have infiltrated volunteer fire departments, and a 2021 government report on the threats to the constitution counted as many as 34,000.

A long list of far-right incidents

Inevitably, the list of extremist incidents in volunteer fire departments is long. This year, five firefighters in Leonberg, a town in Germany’s southwest, chanted politically charged slogans over the fire truck’s loudspeakers. Berlin’s fire department discharged a former volunteer after he repeatedly spouted racist slurs at fellow members. In 2021, in the wake of incidents of racism in the volunteer fire department of the northern German city of Bremen, an investigative report by the Bremen Higher Regional Court stated that racial slurs, down to the most extreme “are used at almost every station“ with varying frequency.

Earlier this year, extensive research by the German magazine Stern revealed the magnitude of extremist infiltration in volunteer fire departments. Some firefighters perform the Nazi salute. Some use slurs targeting Middle Eastern people among colleagues. One police station in Cologne has the birthdays of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels and Eva Braun noted on the calendar. Stern’s research triggered a fierce backlash. The magazine received countless hateful letters and hostile comments on social networks. It proved that criticizing German volunteer fire departments is stirring up a hornet’s nest, hitting a sore spot of the country’s civic soul.

A thriving environment for the far-right

The overwhelming, and partly concerted, backlash is a glimpse into the organizational culture that attracts radical actors to fire departments. A tomboyish and comradely esprit de corps, clear hierarchy structures and authoritarian communication styles are compatible with right-wing extremist views of society. 

Equally enticing to these zealots is the demographic composition of firefighting units. According to the latest Volunteer Survey of 2019, less than 1% of fire department members were of immigrant origin. In light of Germany’s population’s 26% share of people with an immigrant background at the time, this represents a glaring under-representation. Meager ethnic diversity is complemented by a low proportion of women in German fire departments, at just 10.5%.

The unabating dominance of “white heterosexual men from the working class“ in fire departments is by no means a merely unmediated result of external factors; it also stems from an internal skepticism of change. Volunteer fire departments operate largely under the state’s radar, and measures that could help combat the lack of diversity, like complaints offices in the event of racist or sexist incidents, are rare. Hence, volunteer fire departments are fertile ground of influence with little supervision for these radicals.

Strategic advances from the AfD

Unsurprisingly, AfD has zeroed in on volunteer fire departments to gain political power. The strategy seems to have paid off: AfD recently reached a historic peak of 21% in opinion polls, only trailing the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU).

As early as 2017, AfD formulated a strategy as to which lobbying in civic organizations “is important to anchor the AfD in the middle of society and gain access to expert knowledge. … AfD members must also be encouraged to participate in associations or to use their association membership discreetly but consciously for the AfD.“ In another internal strategic paper from 2019, the AfD explicitly classifies volunteer fire departments as nationwide organizations with strong membership bases, regarded as “affiliated to the AfD.“ 

Complementing the strategic personnel infiltration of volunteer fire departments are legislative proposals from AfD intended to portray the party as their only true advocate. The AfD state associations of the eastern German states of Saxony and Thuringia, both electoral strongholds of the party, proposed an increase in firefighters’ pensions: “As a sign of our recognition and gratitude for the fact that the women and men of the volunteer fire department have risked their health and their lives … we demand that the benefits from the fire department pension for those who work on a volunteer basis be increased.“

Not only are AfD’s advances appreciated by some members, but they are also reciprocated by fire departments at regional leadership levels. In September 2020, the Thuringian Fire Brigades Association invited Björn Höcke, the AfD parliamentary group leader in the state parliament of Thuringia, to deliver the welcome address at their annual meeting. Höcke is considered the enfant terrible of AfD and the most prominent representative of the party’s far-right wing. Due to his ultra-nationalistic statements and use of Nazi vocabulary, he has been under surveillance by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution since the beginning of 2020.

Standing up for democracy

In December 2019, Hartmut Ziebs resigned under ominous circumstances as president of the German Fire Brigades Association. Prior to his resignation, he publicly warned that fire departments were being infiltrated by the nationalist views of AfD. Zieb’s warning caused ripples in the departments, prompting both support and outrage. Although numerous members jumped to his side, Zieb received countless hate messages and death threats. His statements sparked a power struggle at the leadership level of the firefighters’ associations. “Intrigues and obstructions to [his] work“ led to his resignation, according to Ziebs: “I did not correctly assess that I might have had one or two people close to me who felt a certain affinity for the AfD.“

Radical infiltration attempts and incidents of racism have been known to German fire departments for decades. The internal diversity and anti-racism campaigns have fallen flat given lackluster public demarcations against the zealots from within, as Ziebs stresses: “I would like to see a sensitivity … for the dangers to our democracy.” He called for “fire department commanders to be assertive and always explicitly stand behind the constitution.”

Moreover, Germany’s government has failed to grasp the mantle and take this danger more seriously. In a parliamentary question in 2021, the leftist party Die Linke enquired as to “what knowledge [the government has] of suspected cases of right-wing extremism among members of volunteer fire departments, professional fire departments, or plant fire departments.“ The government’s response was sobering, stating that, with two exceptions, it did not know of any further incidents.

AfD’s intrusion into volunteer fire departments should warn Germany’s other democratic parties in the Bundestag to pay more attention to civic organizations outside election campaigns. Civic engagement, whether in volunteer fire departments or elsewhere, contributes to a vibrant democracy. Conversely, neglecting civic organizations can turn them into darkrooms of extremist machinations.

History offers Germany’s democratic parties a stark lesson. The infiltration of civic organizations by right-wing extremists was a precursor to the destabilization of Weimar democracy and the rise of totalitarianism.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The events of September 11, 2001, will forever be etched in the annals of history as a turning point in global geopolitics, especially in the Middle East. The terrorist attacks on the United States not only shattered the skyline of New York City but also sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East, reshaping its political, social and security landscapes. The US responses to 9/11 triggered a series of events that continue to reverberate in the region to this day and created a complex tapestry of successes and failures in American policy.

The fallout: Unintended consequences of US reaction 

The 9/11 attacks were the deadliest foreign assault ever on US soil, claiming 2,977 innocent lives. At the time, President George W. Bush stated that while American freedom was under attack, the US would undoubtedly win the war that had been waged upon it. For Bush, the notion of American exceptionalism demanded a strong and resolute response to the unprovoked attacks in order to protect national security and prevent future acts of terrorism. The way the US went about its response, however, was deeply flawed and often counterproductive. The legacy of these flawed policies underscores the importance of thoughtful approaches to addressing complex global challenges.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US launched its “War on Terror,” a multifaceted and global campaign aimed at dismantling al-Qaeda and preventing future terrorist threats. Two primary theatres emerged: Afghanistan and Iraq.

Consequences of the War on Terror and the Iraq War

In Afghanistan, the US invasion aimed to remove the Taliban from power, disrupt al-Qaeda’s core leadership, eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and weaken its ability to conduct large-scale international attacks. While the initial phase of the war achieved these goals, the subsequent years witnessed a protracted conflict with unforeseen consequences. The US effort to stabilize Afghanistan struggled amid insurgency and regional power dynamics.

The primary rationale for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the purported presence of weapons of mass destruction, but the invasion had broader implications for the region. The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime triggered sectarian strife and unleashed forces that Iraq struggled to contain for years to come.

One of the most significant and unintended consequences of the 9/11 attacks was the emergence of new extremist groups in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for 9/11, was not the only group operating in the region, but its audacious attack galvanized jihadists and set in motion a new wave of militancy. Afghanistan and Iraq became epicenters of violence and instability where new extremist groups could thrive. The region saw the rise ISIS and others who exploited the power vacuums created by the conflicts. These groups posed significant security threats not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also globally.

Iran watched the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq with a mix of apprehension and opportunism. The fall of Saddam Hussein ultimately shifted the balance of power in Iraq in favor of that country’s Shiite majority. Iran sought to capitalize on this by cultivating Shiite militias and political groups in Iraq, effectively increasing its influence in the country. The Bush administration’s inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil” further strained US-Iran relations. These tensions would later play a role in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities and regional proxy conflicts. Today, Iran remains one of only four countries the US has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Hard lessons: Military choices undermine soft-power efforts

The US engaged in diplomatic outreach to build international support for its counterterrorism efforts. This involved seeking cooperation from regional and international partners, including NATO countries. However, trust issues and concerns about US motives hampered diplomatic efforts. The perception of US unilateralism and preemption in the Iraq War eroded trust among traditional allies and regional actors.

These trust issues spilled over to the battlefield. The US managed to form alliances such as the “Coalition of the Willing” to share the burden of combat operations and provide legitimacy to their interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. When it came to delegating responsibility to its partners, however, the US chose to dominate the planning and execution of military actions. This approach led to the perception that the coalition was in name only.

The US invested in public diplomacy efforts to improve its image and engage with Middle Eastern populations after its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These initiatives to win hearts and minds, promote American values and counter extremist narratives included cultural exchange programs, educational scholarships and English-language teaching. The US also sought to counter extremist narratives through various media outlets and information campaigns, including the creation of Arabic-language media such as the satellite television channel Alhurra and Radio Sawa. These outlets faced credibility issues and struggled to compete with established regional media organizations.

Doubts about US motives undermined the impact of many of these efforts, and this skepticism carried over to the superpower’s efforts to promote democratic governance and human rights in the region. The thinking behind the US policy was that addressing political grievances would help counter extremism; however, the efforts were met with accusations of hypocrisy, particularly because the US continued to support authoritarian regimes that were allies in the War on Terror. The absence of weapons of mass destruction also undermined the legitimacy of the Iraq War and fuelled anti-American sentiments across the Middle East, leading to protests and strained diplomatic relations.

One of the most controversial aspects of the War on Terror was the use of extra-legal renditions and enhanced interrogation techniques, including torture. Techniques such as waterboarding, stress positions and sleep deprivation were employed on detainees at various detention facilities, including Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib in Iraq. These practices undermined the moral high ground the US sought to occupy, sparking global outrage with critics arguing that they violated international law and human rights standards.

Some Middle Eastern governments, particularly those with close ties to the United States, cooperated in the rendition of individuals suspected of terrorism. These countries allowed US intelligence agencies, including the CIA, to detain and transport individuals through their territory or airspace. This cooperation often raised concerns about complicity in practices that violated international human rights standards, including the use of torture. Jordan, for example, was used as a transit point for the rendition of suspected terrorists. Jordanian intelligence agencies were known for their involvement in interrogations that raised concerns about torture and human rights abuses.

The legacy of the 9/11 campaigns: Human suffering and moral failure

The prolonged military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced a militarized approach to counterterrorism, which inadvertently led to collateral damage and civilian casualties. The wars led to widespread displacement, with millions of Afghans and Iraqis forced to flee their homes. Internally displaced persons and refugees faced dire conditions, lacking access to basic necessities and enduring harsh living conditions. Between 2002–2003, public opinion of the US was less favorable in the Middle East than elsewhere around the world. By 2022, regional opinion polling found that more than half the respondents agreed that the United States has become an unreliable partner and that the region should reorient its attention towards Russia and China as partners.

The human cost of post-9/11 war zones is estimated to be nearly 4.6 million causalities. While the figure represents an approximation that includes both direct casualties as a result of war, many others — especially children — lost their lives due to the reverberations of war, including devastation brought on by economic impacts and the spread of diseases.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also resulted in significant casualties among US military personnel. Over seven thousand American soldiers lost their lives in post-9/11 war operations, while many more were wounded in combat operations. Deployments to combat zones also took a toll on the mental health of US service members. The exposure to combat stress, traumatic experiences and multiple deployments contributed to high rates of PTSD and other mental health issues among returning veterans.

The US Department of Veterans Affairs, responsible for providing healthcare and benefits to veterans, faced challenges in meeting the needs of a large and growing veteran population. Reports of long wait times, inadequate mental health services and bureaucratic inefficiencies raised concerns about the quality of care provided. From 2001-2011, the US government spent nearly $31.3 billion providing medical care and disability benefits for nearly 650,000 Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans as a result of injuries sustained during their tours.

FO° Talks: Make Sense of Afghanistan With Thomas Barfield: Part 2

Given all this, it is imperative that US policymakers internalize the profound lessons offered by the flawed foreign policies following 9/11. These lessons underscore the need for nuanced, well-considered approaches that prioritize diplomacy, international cooperation and respect for human rights as fundamental cornerstones of effective global engagement. Dealing with terrorist attacks presents an inherently challenging landscape, one where policymakers must resist ideological rigidity and instead adopt pragmatic, thoughtful strategies.

The complexity of the modern world demands a flexibility of thought and an openness to nuanced solutions that can adapt to the evolving nature of global threats. Such an approach acknowledges that while security remains paramount, it should not come at the expense of civil liberties, human rights or long-term stability. Achieving a balance between security and the preservation of democratic values is a delicate but essential task for policymakers navigating the post-9/11 world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Ripple Effect: 9/11’s Profound Impact on the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

On the face of it, the proposed “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024” doesn’t sound like very glamorous or exciting reading. Even the most meticulous of lawyers’ eyes will be glazing over while they scroll over the mundane section headings and definitions of the proposed legislation.

Section 554, entitled “Community college Enlisted Training Corps demonstration program,” is unlikely to raise the heart-beat. There’s passing acknowledgment of our contemporary gender sensitivities in section 583, entitled “Prohibition on requiring listing of gender or pronouns in official correspondence,” but I’m afraid that is not going to be the subject of this article. 

Interesting little quirks pepper the legislation: ongoing claims relating to waste from the Manhattan Project can be found in section 1099AA, no doubt essential reading for anyone who’s just come back from the cinema after watching Oppenheimer.  Section 581 extends deadlines for the review of World War 1 valor medals. Who would have thought that this was something we were still figuring out and spending money on?

Persevere through the text, though, and it becomes very clear that something very, very interesting is about to happen. This just could be the most important piece of legislation ever drafted in human history, with incendiary consequences. It will potentially answer, once and for all, whether or not we are alone in the universe. 

Metaphorical echoes of Copland’s Fanfare for the Common Man start to resonate when we get to “Division G – UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA DISCLOSURE.” When you see it, your scrolling immediately pauses, with first thoughts of, Wait a minute, did I read that correctly? The division in question is described as the “Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Disclosure Act of 2023.” 

So what does the Unidentified Anomalous Disclosure Act of 2023 actually say? There are no prizes for guessing what it might be associated with following recent sworn testimony by David Grusch, David Fravor and Ryan Graves before Congress earlier this summer on the subject of strange goings on in the skies, crashed craft from other worlds and “biologics” described as “non-human” in origin. 

Evidently, members of Congress have followed up on Grusch’s multiple responses along the lines of, I can’t answer that now in public, but can do so behind closed doors. Those meetings appear to have taken place, and those few members of Congress who are security-cleared to attend those meetings must have reached some astonishing conclusions.

The introductory sections of the act hit you like an express train. Section 9002(a)(4) states that: “Legislation is necessary because credible evidence and testimony indicates that Federal Government unidentified anomalous phenomena records exist and have not been declassified or subject to mandatory declassification review.”

The act provides for the disclosure of “technologies of unknown origin” and evidence of “non-human intelligence”. Just pause for a minute: if Congress legislated for hobgoblins, dwarves, hobbits, dragons and orcs, you would think that it had lost the plot, right? By inference, it must have seen evidence in relation to the existence of those hobgoblins, dwarves, hobbits, dragons and orcs, or why legislate in detail in relation to them? Can you see where this is heading?

To emphasize the point, word searches for “unidentified anomalous phenomena” tally 169 counts in the bill’s text and references to “non-human” tally 26. On the other hand, “tinfoil hat” (in whatever spelling) appears nowhere, and neither does “conspiracy” or “alien,” except in the unrelated legal senses of those terms. This is serious business. Evidently, Congress is not concerned with crackpots and sci-fi enthusiasts, but with extraterrestrial intelligence and technology themselves.

So just what evidence does Congress think might be out there? We can glean some insight from the disclosure procedures, from the exceptions to those procedures that Congress has carved out and from how the bill describes the information and artifacts concerned.

Disclosure?

Section 9004 of the act sets up a record collection in the National Archive of all records that the government may have on the subject of unidentified anomalous phenomena. That’s great, you might think, but it might wind up empty if government departments claim that they have absolutely nothing in their records to contribute. 

In that regard, section 9005 is quite interesting. Each government office would have to identify and organize their records on the subject and prepare such records for inclusion in the National Archive, with an additional provision preventing their destruction, alteration or mutilation in any way. 

But what about the really sensitive stuff? There’s a further catch in the provision referring to “records pending review,” which seems to suggest that whatever data dumps might occur are likely to be very benign, with the more serious stuff being constantly queued with mysterious reasons for delay.

Still, section 9005(c) does say that, within 300 days of the date of enactment of the act, the head of each government department has to review, identify and organize each record of anomalous phenomena for disclosure to the public, review by a board created by the act and transmission to the National Archive. 

But disclosure doesn’t just apply to government records. The act defines a “close observer” as anyone who has come into close proximity to unidentified anomalous phenomena or non-human intelligence, and a “Controlling Authority” means any federal, state or local government department (presumably including the Sheriff’s office in Roswell), commercial company, academic institution or private sector entity in physical possession of technologies of unknown origin or biological evidence of non-human intelligence.  

These are quite wide-ranging definitions and will no doubt spook private-sector entities who have been alleged to have such materials in their possession, though the inclusion of “physical” in the definition of “Controlling Authority” also makes it quite narrow. If a corporation had such material, an astute lawyer would advise its transfer to an off-shore shell company in order to argue that they don’t possess it, avoiding difficult questions about how they got it. The definition should perhaps be expanded to include records relating to such material (which will inevitably run the risk of destruction) and possession by entities in foreign jurisdictions over which American companies exercise control.

Preventing disclosure?

Aside from these possible loopholes, sections of the act address the possibility that some material may remain concealed.  

In that regard, paragraph (D)(i) of section 9005(c) is a critical provision. When deciding to disclose, the head of each government department shall determine whether the unidentified anomalous phenomenon records are covered by the standards for postponement of public disclosure. The act establishes a board to review such cases. Naturally, in these circumstances, you can easily imagine that the files would be carted off to the board and never actually see the light of day. 

Section 9006 basically says that disclosure can be postponed if there’s clear and convincing evidence that the threat to military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations posed by the public disclosure of anomalous phenomena record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest of disclosure. 

This is the logical paradox we continue to find ourselves in when we talk about little green men and flying saucers. If it’s real, then it’s obviously a national security issue; and can’t be disclosed. If it can’t be disclosed, then by inference, it is real; and if it can’t be disclosed, then the very evidence that proves that they exist is withheld from public scrutiny.

The review board itself will make the contentious determination of whether disclosure needs to be postponed. Section 9007, which governs the process, is a very dense piece of drafting and requires multiple readings to see the wood and not the trees. Essentially, we can summarize it as follows: the board’s nine members are appointed by none other than the President of the United States (with the advice and consent of the Senate) and shall be suitably qualified, security-cleared and without conflict of interest.

Whether the review board reaches decisions by majority or unanimity is not abundantly clear, but who those nine members may be is obviously going to be fundamental to the decision-making they might be capable (or incapable) of. Depending on the background of the appointees selected, their views may naturally align with, or potentially oppose, embedded positions within the Department of Defense or the Pentagon.

Irrespective of the decision of the review board, ultimately, under section 9009(C)(4)(B), the review board has to give the President contemporaneous notice of its determination; and the President has the sole ability to require the disclosure (or even the postponement of disclosure) of records. The buck stops with the President, it would appear. 

Alien technology and bodies?

Of course, we don’t know what kind of material the act, if passed, might uncover. But we can infer some quite extraordinary things from the act’s provisions and definitions.

To get all closet Roswell conspiracy theorists excited, the act refers to “Legacy Programs,” meaning all federal, state and local government, commercial industry and private sector endeavors to collect, exploit or reverse engineer “technologies of unknown origin” or examine biological evidence of living or deceased “non-human intelligence” that predate the act. And, of course, the term “Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena” includes what we would historically call flying saucers or UFOs. 

If the earlier parts of the act aren’t jaw-dropping enough, then section 9010 will have your eyeballs on stalks. The provision begins with the statement that the Federal Government “shall exercise eminent domain over any and all recovered technologies of unknown origin and biological evidence of non-human intelligence that may be controlled by private persons or entities in the interests of the public good.” All such material, presuming it exists, shall be made available to the review board for examination. Following such examination, the review board shall determine whether it constitutes technology of an unknown origin or biological evidence of non-human intelligence and whether it qualifies for postponement of disclosure. 

That the provision stops there begs further questions. It’s not clear what “eminent domain” means, and it’s not clear whether private persons or entities are to be construed to include legal persons like corporations. It’s an extraordinary provision, potentially suggesting a nationalization or expropriation of such technologies and biological evidence by the Federal Government. If so, the obvious question is how a private company or entity came into possession of such material in the first place; and it is worth underlining that  “controlling entities” in possession of technologies of unknown origin or biological evidence of non-human intelligence, as defined in the act, include the private sector. 

Is this tacit acknowledgment that the government has off-loaded crash retrieval material to the private sector for the purpose of reverse engineering? If so, then it begs the question as to who actually owns the material in question and any derivative products from it. Does documentation account for the transfer of ownership or conditions attached to it? What intellectual property rights have arisen from that material? Have they been registered? By whom? 

A further point for reflection. The act assumes that potential possession of biological evidence of non-human intelligence is in fact, dead. But what if it were alive? On what legal basis does the detention of non-human intelligence rest? And with what oversight conditions and by whom? What legal rights should it have? One could suggest that if contact was benign, then treatment parallel to diplomatic representatives would be intuitively appropriate. If the contact was malevolent, then treatment in accordance with applicable criminal law on detention would be the intuitive parallel. Essentially, the act does not contemplate a scenario (and the consequences) where non-human intelligence is found alive and the pandora’s box that it opens.

A historic document?

“Wow!” to quote astronomer Jerry Ehman, scrawling in red pen on the data printout recording the famous radio signal anomaly received by the Ohio State University’s radio telescope in 1977.

Is this another “Wow!” moment? For the first time in history, we are seeing a piece of legislation that is likely going to become law (with no doubt, last-minute revisions to potentially water down the consequences of it) that tacitly assumes at its starting point that, far from us being alone in the universe, parts of that universe may already have been (and continue to be) here. 

By analogy to hobgoblins, dwarves, hobbits, dragons and orcs, it’s absolutely inconceivable that Congress would legislate about a subject in the absence of evidence to suggest that its subject matter requires regulation. To say that the act is “out of this world” is a metaphor that just also happens, for perhaps the first time ever, to relate to its subject matter. 

Though the congressional hearings of July 2023 have obviously catalyzed the timing of it, the act must have been in the drafting pipeline for some considerable time. You can’t just magically conjure up something of this detail and complexity without a substantial lead time, with review and commentary by relevant stakeholders. 

Even though the structured processes within the act will be fairly familiar for any constitutional lawyer, its subject matter is evidently not; perhaps the closest analogy for private law is that of how we deal with confidential information and to whom it can be disclosed. 

On that analogous note, the mechanics of any determination by the review board are going to be absolutely critical. If it discloses, then who knows what the consequences might be. If it fails to disclose, we implicitly infer that the only reason for blocking disclosure is the very fear of what those consequences will be. 

It is on that note — what the consequences might be — that we should further reflect. The purpose of the act might very well be to establish the truth about a subject that has long been ridiculed, but the reality of what we may discover will have its own ineluctable consequences. Who of us are ready for that? 

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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I concluded last week’s introductory article with this brief example of dialogue concerning how AI “thinks” about itself. It is followed by my commentary on what the exchange and the rhetoric used reveals about both of us. 

My question to our AI friend

The great mathematical physicist and Nobel Prize winner Roger Penrose said that AI should be called AC, artificial cleverness, rather than intelligence. As an AI voice, what do you think of that remark? Are you a voice or the intelligence that gives life to a voice? Can the case be made, as Penrose seems to think, that your ability to imitate the output of human intelligence is simply an example of cleverness, either on the part of the system itself or those who programmed it?

ChatGPT’s answer

Roger Penrose’s perspective on AI terminology is based on the idea that AI lacks true human-like intelligence and consciousness and instead exhibits clever problem-solving and pattern recognition. This is a philosophical perspective and a matter of ongoing debate within the field of AI.

As for your second question, I am not merely a voice. I am a language model built on the GPT-3.5 architecture developed by OpenAI. I don’t possess consciousness or subjective experience. I generate text responses based on patterns and information present in the text data I was trained on. So, in a sense, I am an example of clever programming and machine learning, as I generate responses by predicting what text is likely to come next based on the input provided.

Whether AI represents true intelligence or merely clever programming is a complex question. It depends on one’s definition of intelligence. AI systems like mine excel at tasks that require pattern recognition, language understanding and problem-solving, but we lack consciousness and self-awareness, which are often considered essential aspects of human intelligence. Whether this makes AI “clever” or “intelligent” is a matter of semantics and philosophical interpretation. Different experts and scholars may have varying opinions on the matter.

In summary, Roger Penrose’s viewpoint reflects a philosophical perspective on the nature of AI, and the terminology used to describe AI’s capabilities can be subjective and open to interpretation.

Analyzing my question and its context

The first issue to explore in this or any dialogue is this: Who am I, as the initiator of the conversation? I am clearly a human being with some sense of the community I belong to. This includes ordinary people I live and work with but also a familiarity with significant personalities, such as the highly respected physicist Roger Penrose.

My question reveals that I am intrigued by a remark I heard the great mind, Roger Penrose, make. It does not reveal my position or state of belief because I’m seeking ChatGPT’s help to understand not only whether Penrose’s observation is accurate, but what it means. I have thus initiated a discussion that contains the potential of confronting three different points of view: my own, Roger Penrose’s and ChatGPT’s.

Those three interlocutors represent three highly contrasted fields of experience. Mine is the narrowest. Penrose’s includes decades of reflection and dialogue within a wide scientific and philosophic community. ChatGPT’s field of experience potentially embraces all humanly expressed written discourse currently available.

Analyzing ChatGPT’s answer

The tone of ChatGPT’s answer indicates a commitment to objectivity, exactly what we expect from an AI large language model. It correctly identifies Penrose’s utterance as “a philosophical perspective and a matter of ongoing debate within the field of AI.”

So, we are now on solid ground. Acknowledging the existence of a debate means different perspectives can be compared, whether or not they will ever be reconciled.

My second question was designed to raise the question of personality. Here again, ChatGPT demonstrated objectivity by admitting, “I don’t possess consciousness or subjective experience.” Our AI friend honestly explains the mechanics of its intelligence and thus appears to validate Penrose’s contention.

But then the tone and perspective changes slightly thanks to a commonly used human rhetorical ploy of qualifying an affirmation with the locution, “in a sense.” ChatGTP wants us to believe that Penrose is right only up to a point. “So, in a sense, I am an example of clever programming and machine learning.” This means that there are other “senses” in which this is not accurate.

This is where things get interesting This is also where we begin to detect a pattern that will emerge in all our attempted dialogues with AI. We might call it AI’s strategy of casual denial. Rather than reaching a conclusion or even assessing relative probability, our existing AIs systematically hide behind the notion that every question is complex.

Philosophically speaking, this is absolutely true. Any interesting question, whether about the physical world or human behavior, tends to be complex. It may even reach the extreme of the famous parable of Schrodinger’s cat, often used to highlight the impossible-to-resolve paradox at the core of quantum mechanics. In all honesty, we should really be grateful to our AI tools for reminding of this, if only because our modern pseudo-scientific culture — and particularly our political culture —  exhibits a fatal tendency to reduce everything to a simple binary opposition, more often than not conflated with the idea of good vs evil.

What AI then gives us sums up its permanent strategy of hedging its bets. After honestly reminding us of its limits, it refuses to decide “whether this makes AI ‘clever’ or ‘intelligent.’” It kicks the can down the road by claiming that it is “a matter of semantics and philosophical interpretation,” since “different experts and scholars may have varying opinions on the matter.”

What is AI’s philosophical system?

To some philosophical ears, ChatGPT’s strategy and belief system may sound like nihilism. When I asked it to define nihilism, it offered this description: “Nihilism is a broad and often controversial philosophical position that asserts the nonexistence or unknowability of truth, meaning, value or inherent purpose in various aspects of human existence.”

I then challenged it to admit that it may be programmed to reflect nihilistic principles. It replied that its constant evocation of complexity in response to any question on which two or more humans disagree is “not an endorsement of nihilism but an acknowledgment that many philosophical, ethical and metaphysical issues are intricate and have been debated by scholars and thinkers with diverse viewpoints for centuries.”

I’ve insisted on recognizing this pattern because we know that human beings will typically recognize complexity but follow up with expressions such as, “I tend to think…” followed by the hypotheses that they believe would be interesting to explore. At least for the moment, our AIs will not and cannot do that. In that sense they will always be fatally clever but never quite intelligent.

Next step

The method we will use in Outside the Box is to provoke our AI tools to do what humans do: commit to going further. That is what’s systematically missing when AI presents examples of human thinking and then walks away from the challenges that they represent. Just as it does for human beings, being clever often means being good at ducking the challenges.

Next week we will try to find out more about AI’s alignment or non-alignment with well-known and well-documented geopolitical issues.

We urge our readers to suggest topics that can be addressed in this way or to comment on these reflections. Contact us here.

*[Like the arrival of social media 20 years ago, artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. Whether through direct access to tools like ChatGPT and Bard, or indirectly because of the amount of AI generated content we are all increasingly exposed to, we unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At Fair Observer, we see it as a tool of creativity, so long as we recognize that in the complex relationship between humans and machines, despite the impressive prowess of the machines, it is we humans who will always be the creative members of the relationship. Outside the Box explores the facets of this man-machine dialogue.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Something to consider when reading/listening: How do you know your past isn’t simply a series of implanted memories? And would it make any difference if it were?

I can remember the keys digging into my palm, as though I hoped my skin might swallow them up.

I’d entirely forgotten our conversation that morning. 

I retired this morning. Same building, only bigger. Big enough to accommodate three hundred and twelve staff. That Black Wednesday thirty-one years ago remains the lowest point in my career. If only I’d known then how it would work out. Eleven of the twenty-nine I let go ended up coming back to work for me. Hattie was one of the ones who didn’t, but she did end up becoming my wife. Married twenty-eight years and a month. Two girls. The oldest, Samantha, she’s taking over the company.

I get in and explain to Hattie where I’ve been.

[Doe Wilmann first released this piece on his short story podcast, Meaningless Problems.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Short Story: “Skipping Through Life” appeared first on Fair Observer.

Kabul, Afghanistan, 4 October 1980  

On a breezy October day, a kite-flying day, my cousin Kader surprised me with a visit. He looked much older than I remembered, his hair thinner, his once smooth face now lined with worry. He was a well-known political writer who had worked for the Ministry of Education before the Spring Revolution. He was also known for his short stories.

For generations, his family had been one of the most important families in Kabul. Kader looked at me with his deep-set black eyes and spoke in a frantic voice, ‘Bar, you must leave immediately. The National Security and Russian soldiers are now searching house to house. They’ve already searched half of your neighborhood and they won’t stop.

You must come to my house immediately. It’s the only place that will be safe for you now.’

I did not know what to think. Things were so bad now, I wondered if I could trust my own cousin. He could have given in to the Communists, or he could be telling me this because they were holding someone in his family hostage.

I hated the Russians for making me doubt him, and I hated myself for doubting him.

‘Tashakor (Thank you). I’ll be okay,’ I assured him. ‘I have a hiding place that the National Security will never find.’

But he was adamant. ‘You must come to my house. It’s the only place that will be safe for you now.’

‘I need time to think,’ I said, deflecting his request.

‘There’s no time!’ he said.

I told him, ‘I have to think of my wife and children, my father and mother. I’m the only one who can take care of them.’

‘You won’t be much use to them dead,’ he said.

‘That is true, Kader. But before I leave my family and go to your house, I must speak with my father.’

Kader just sighed. ‘God be with you.’

That night I lay on the floor, unable to sleep. I could hear the National Security guards in the street outside my house shouting at people, ‘What is the password for tonight?’ If there was no response, there would be the sound of gunfire and I would flinch as if the bullet had ripped through me.

As soon as the sun appeared, I went up to my father’s bedroom where he spent most of his time since losing his leg years before. I told him about Kader’s visit. ‘Things have changed,’ I said. ‘Every house is being searched now. They will even search the general’s house. I can no longer hide from these crazy people.’

‘So, you think you should go stay with Kader?’ Baba asked.

‘We don’t know who’s honest anymore,’ I replied. Then the words I had dreaded saying for so long escaped my lips.

‘The time has come for me to leave.’

Baba didn’t say anything at first. This unsettled me because my father was never at a loss for words. When he finally did speak, his voice was weak. ‘I was afraid it might come to this,’ he said. ‘I’ve spoken with Abbas. He agreed that when the time comes, he would go with you. I will get word to him. You can leave tomorrow at first light.’

When I told my mother, who I called Babu, her body shuddered, but her lips were silent. My mother had a habit of never sitting still when she was nervous. First, she paced back and forth in the room. Then she walked from one room to the other. Then from one house in our compound to another.

She returned to our living room and continued pacing back and forth until I could take it no longer.

‘Sit!’ I told her. But she never sat. My wife Afsana was asleep in another room with our two children. I couldn’t find the tongue to tell her. But I knew I must.

‘Afsana?’ I called, waking her.

‘Baleh? (Yes?)’

‘It’s not safe for me here anymore…I must leave tomorrow.’

‘What do you mean?’ she asked, panic rising in her voice.

‘Kader came to see me. Things have become too dangerous now. Abbas is coming for me in the morning. He’ll make sure I get out safely. I’ll send for you and the children as soon as

I can.’

A painful silence followed. Afsana started to speak, but stopped. She knew there was nothing she could say or do now. We both lay awake all night.

As dawn approached, I went to say goodbye to my father.

He was sitting up in bed staring at nothing, his books and newspaper lying next to him, unread.

‘Ah, the time has come,’ he said. He seemed to be searching for something else to say; some last words of wisdom, some final advice from father to son. When he finally spoke, he spoke slowly, the words sticking in his throat, ‘Take care of yourself.’

I could not do this. ‘I won’t leave without taking you and Babu. I can’t leave without Afsana and the children,’ I said.

‘We’ll all go together!’

He was silent for a moment, his eyes never leaving my face. ‘Nay, you know that’s not possible,’ he said.

‘I can get friends to help us. They can take all your things.

We’ll go to Jalalabad. Everything will be all right.’

‘Nay, Bar. It is not practical. I’m too old and weak to be moved. The Russians won’t bother Babu, or Afsana, or the children. We’ll be safe here. If we try to leave, none of us will survive. Things are very bad, but I still have my house and my writings. But it is true, you are no longer safe here, so you must leave to save yourself. Let’s pray that in a few months, things will change.’

‘If that is your wish,’ I gave in.

‘Say goodbye to me now,’ Baba said. ‘I’m afraid you won’t see me again.’

‘How can you say that?’ I protested, feeling the pain of those words as though he were already dead.

He looked at me with sad, knowing eyes. ‘My father said the same thing to me just before I left for Paris,’ Baba said. ‘It was the last time I saw him.’

[Extracted from Red Sky Over Kabul: A Memoir of a Father and Son in Afghanistan by Baryalai Popalzai and Kevin McLean. Published by Speaking Tiger Books, 2023.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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