By Ramadan Ilazi and Jeta Loshaj

As what in the Western Balkans societies is by now perceived as a cliché the European Union (EU) has since 2003 been saying, sometimes more firmly and other times more out of habit, that the future of the Western Balkans is in the EU. This promise or vision has never been second-guessed by the EU, but what has happened is that it has thinned over time, worn down by vetoes from member states, procedural fatigue, and changing political priorities in Brussels and other EU capitals.

However, EU’s enlargement policy is now said to be “back on the agenda,” a result of a harsher geopolitical reality after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a shock that reminded EU leaders, much as the wars of Yugoslavia in the 1990s once did, that EU integration has often advanced often through crisis. However, despite the renewed momentum, enlargement does not seem to be moving as effectively in practice.

Albania and Montenegro are moving forward, however slowly. The remaining four countries of the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia) are stuck in various forms of limbo. This is not only their problem, but it is increasingly becoming EU’s challenge as well.

Perhaps the mistake that Brussels seems to make sometimes is treating enlargement policy as a binary choice between accession and waiting. Therefore, in reality the most damaging gap often lies in between, and that is to say the absence of meaningful operational integration of the entire region of the Western Balkans.

Western Balkan institutions are largely excluded from EU’s institutional ecosystem and the practical workings in the fields of mutual interest such as cybersecurity, rule-of-law, and disinformation, among others. “At best”, the EU requests semi-formal cooperation from them on ad-hoc basis, mainly when it deems necessary from the point of view of its interests, for instance when facing a specific security threat, when it has a significant economic interest or when its funds are in question.

With two clear frontrunners from the Western Balkans and their prospects for some kind of EU accession during this decade or soon after (of course, big IF-s remain), the challenge for the EU is what can be done with the remaining four in terms of bringing them further in.

One potential answer to this is the idea of operational integration, which would focus on bringing in different thematic authorities/institutions from the WB6 (e.g., cybersecurity) into the EU institutional system, mostly the European Commission and related institutions such as specialized agencies.

In other words, operational integration is a form of pre-accession integration in which Western Balkan institutions are embedded into selected EU operational workflows and mechanisms without conferring membership rights to those who join.

This can be implemented through instruments such as observer status/ advanced working arrangements, liaison officers, contact points, participation in policy forums, technical groups and joint exercises, interoperable procedures and reporting formats, and, where legally possible, controlled access to secure communication and information-sharing channels.

Operational integration is not a substitute for membership or the accession process, nor a shortcut around the accession criteria. It is a pragmatic way to think about how to bring Western Balkan institutional systems and economies closer into the EU’s operational ecosystem.

Participation is benchmarked, differentiated by policy area, and reversible, so that access expands with demonstrated capacity and compliance by WB6 governments (including data protection, confidentiality and vetting) and can be suspended if standards are not met. As such, it is also a practical way to implement the EU enhanced enlargement, methodology endorsed and brought forward by the EU in early 2020, through more robust conditionality, both positive and negative.

In other words, operational integration can be also seen as a trial run. As operational integration would advance, the EU and Member States would also become more accustomed to seeing WB6 institutions present in the EU institutional ecosystem, and creating collegiality. Also, the tools already exist, but what is missing is the political decision to use them systematically.

Operational integration gives Western Balkan institutions an opportunity for direct influence on EU systems, mechanisms and thus moves our region’s countries from passive recipients of EU support to active contributors directly within the Union’s core mechanisms.

This approach also offers our region a concrete platform to demonstrate to EU sceptics that the Western Balkans can become good members in the future, by proving themselves as rational, responsible partners within EU system who add value to EU security.

And, of course, this approach protects EU interests, since as the old argument goes, developments in Western Balkans, for good or bad, can have direct effect in the EU (e.g., the Balkan route remains a critical pathway for drug and human trafficking into the EU).

If the Western Balkans remain outside the EU’s mechanisms for countering cyberattacks, disinformation, corrosive capital, and malign foreign influence, the EU exposes itself to significant vulnerabilities. Research shows that disinformation narratives tested in the region frequently migrate into EU member states. Russia, for example, operates major outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik from Serbia, amplifying its influence.

The Western Balkans are already functionally intertwined with the EU’s information and economic space, a reality often acknowledged by Brussels. Leaving the region only partially integrated creates security gaps on both sides. Operational integration between the Western Balkans Six (WB6) and the EU can address this challenge. There several policy areas where operational integration is common sense and of mutual benefit. Cybersecurity, investment security, rule of law, disinformation, are clear examples.

Operational integration in cybersecurity starts with advancing current forms of cooperation between EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and WB6, through formal working arrangements with each WB6 national authority, appointing contact points, setting annual priorities, etc. WB6 teams should participate in ENISA-led training and exercises, use compatible incident categories and reporting templates, and agree on protocols for handling cross-border incidents.

Next, WB6 authorities should establish structured liaison with EU CSIRTs, including notification and coordination protocols tested through joint exercises. Where possible, WB6 experts would be invited to observe or join ENISA technical working groups on a defined scope. The most important ask here is to grant all WB6 observer status, which require the EU to amend the Cybersecurity Act, but in the meantime, the goal is greater interoperability.

All WB6 countries need to accelerate alignment with EU norms and strengthen their own agencies and legislation on cybersecurity, which we outline in this paper prepared in the framework of the IGNITA initiative.

For investment security and given the room and vulnerability for economic and security influence in WB6 of non-Western powers, their governments need to adopt functioning FDI screening systems in line with the Regulation (EU) 2019/452, which we detail in this paper developed with regional experts as part of IGNITA initiative. WB6 also need to be invited as observers in the EU’s FDI Screening Contact Points network and Expert Group.

The practical solution is a Commission-coordinated WB6–EU interface, with shared notification templates, a common risk taxonomy, and regular joint briefings to flag sensitive transactions and receive feedback. Participation could be built through invitation-based technical sessions, not as full Member State access. The current EU–WB6 cooperation on FDI screening is fragmented and needs to be anchored in a standing format.

In rule of law, operational integration means initially including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the EU’s annual rule of law report, and then establishing working arrangements between each of the WB6 and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). The later would improve cooperation on hate crime, discrimination, digital rights, and protections for vulnerable groups.

EPPO integration requires completing working arrangements with all WB6 countries (currently Kosovo and Serbia are behind), with clear contact points, standard referral formats, and joint training on procurement fraud and grant manipulation.

Civil service exchange should be launched, placing WB6 officials inside Commission Directorates-General (e.g., for up to six months), working on live files. Eurojust integration should move from project-based engagement to regular coordination meetings, secure channels,...

European Western Balkans

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