With few exceptions, much of the literature critiquing the Khalistan movement has been produced by scholars, commentators, journalists and policymakers who, for ideological, political or personal reasons, have been sceptical of, or openly hostile towards, the idea of an independent sovereign Sikh state.

By Gurnam Singh | Opinion |

I am grateful to Ranveer Singh for engaging so thoughtfully with my article, The Feasibility of Khalistan: A Critical Assessment, published in Asia Samachar (Aug 26, 2026). His response, Realism According to Whom? A Response to “The Feasibility of Khalistan”, first appeared on his Substack before being republished in Asia Samachar (Sept 7, 2026).

As a respected author and publisher, I would have expected nothing less than a serious and challenging engagement with the arguments I presented. Given the significance of the issues at stake, and recognising that no individual possesses either the authority or the wisdom to pass final judgement on the question of Sikh sovereignty, such scrutiny is both welcome and necessary. Indeed, it is my hope that our exchange encourages others to examine these issues critically and contributes to a broader discussion about the future of Sikh aspirations for sovereignty and self-determination.

Problematising the Framing of the Khalistan Narrative

With few exceptions, much of the literature critiquing the Khalistan movement has been produced by scholars, commentators, journalists and policymakers who, for ideological, political or personal reasons, have been sceptical of, or openly hostile towards, the idea of an independent sovereign Sikh state. As a consequence, the movement has often been analysed through a predominantly security-oriented lens rather than as a political project rooted in questions of self-determination, minority rights, federalism, state violence and historical grievance.

Opposition to Khalistan has frequently been framed through narratives of “extremism”, “terrorism”, “religious fanaticism”, “gangsterism” and foreign conspiracy, portraying Sikh demands for sovereignty as irrational, dangerous or externally manipulated rather than as a legitimate, if contested, expression of political aspiration.

This framing is evident in both academic and public discourse. Studies of the Sikh insurgency in Punjab during the 1980s and 1990s, for example, have often focused overwhelmingly on militant violence while devoting comparatively less attention to the political circumstances that contributed to the conflict, including human rights abuses and, many would argue, acts amounting to state-sponsored violence against Sikhs. Similarly, contemporary discussions of pro-Khalistan activism in the diaspora frequently emphasise concerns about radicalisation, criminal networks or foreign interference, while paying less attention to why demands for Sikh self-determination continue to resonate among many Sikhs in Punjab and across the diaspora decades after the insurgency formally ended.

This asymmetry between Indian state narratives and those of Sikh activists becomes particularly visible when comparisons are made with other nationalist and self-determination movements. Political aspirations for Kurdish statehood, Palestinian sovereignty, Scottish independence, and Catalan, Irish or Québécois nationalism are generally studied as political phenomena worthy of critical examination, regardless of whether scholars support their objectives. By contrast, Khalistan has often been approached as a security problem to be managed rather than a legitimate political claim to be interrogated. This tendency has narrowed the scope of inquiry, leading researchers to focus on the consequences of the movement rather than the social, historical and political conditions that gave rise to it.

Against the backdrop of such a sustained assault on the legitimacy of the Khalistan case, it is understandable why advocates of Khalistan may be reluctant to discuss the efficacy or limitations of the project itself. However, all political movements require critical self-analysis if they are to develop and mature. Simply refusing to confront difficult questions is not a viable option.

Ideally, a more comprehensive scholarship would examine both the movement’s critics and its proponents, situating the movement within broader debates on nationalism, sovereignty, decolonisation, diaspora politics and the rights of minorities to political self-determination. Such an approach would neither romanticise nor demonise the movement; it would be to seek to understand it as a complex historical and political phenomenon.

It was precisely the desire to challenge the polarisation surrounding this debate and to encourage a more balanced evaluation of the movement that motivated my original article and, indeed, this response to Ranveer Singh’s critique. It is my sincere hope that together we can create a space for this kind of engagement within Sikh intellectual and political circles. As someone who values reason and critical thinking, I remain convinced that open, rigorous and respectful dialogue offers the best route towards advancing both the interests of the Panth and the broader aspiration for sovereignty.

The Essence of the Argument

In his critique, Ranveer Singh begins by commending me for “starting the conversation”. Given that discussions concerning Khalistan, or more broadly Sikh sovereignty, can be traced back at least to the establishment of the Khalsa in 1699, I assume he meant initiating a conversation about the movement in its contemporary form.

Indeed, he qualifies his own position by noting that the present-day case for Khalistan “has its own historical form” and that Sikh resistance to external domination did not begin in 1984. I entirely agree that contemporary political questions must be understood through their deeper historical antecedents. Nevertheless, the purpose of my original article was not to offer a comprehensive historical exegesis, but rather to provide an assessment of the movement’s present circumstances and possible options to advance the struggle for Sikh sovereignty.

A significant difficulty I have with Ranveer Singh’s critique is his tendency to move the discussion away from material realities facing the struggle and into the realm of ideas and, at times, the metaphysical. This is perhaps most evident in his invocation of Indic cosmology through the concept of Kaljug as a counterpoint to what he regards as the limitations of the modern nation-state.

Certainly, questions of ontology, epistemology, power and morality are relevant to any discussion of sovereignty. However, my analysis proceeded from the assumption that the contemporary Khalistan movement, as articulated by many of its advocates, broadly seeks a form of sovereignty recognisable within the existing international system. I recall during the early 1980’s advocates of Khalistan, most notably Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan, Ganga Singh Dhillon, Balbir Singh Sandhu, Kirpal Singh Sihra and Sewa Singh Lali, producing symbols of a nation state, such as passports, currency, flags, possible constitutions, maps embassies and a government in exile. My frame of reference was therefore the modern democratic nation-state, understood through these aspirations and a widely accepted UN based criteria, including those codified in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.

According to these criteria, a state requires a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Ranveer Singh’s observation that my argument operates largely within this framework is therefore entirely correct.

Unlike Ranvir Singh’s approach, which draws heavily upon concepts such as Guru Khalsa Panth, Halemi Raj and Patshahi, my concern was with the practical realities of state formation and international recognition. As a Sikh, I fully acknowledge the importance of Sikh scripture, history and political philosophy in shaping the values and institutions of any future Sikh polity. However, I would argue that the establishment of a viab...

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