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The court noted that, in such lawsuits, those suits proceed against SEPTA alone, as a wholly independent entity and without the involvement of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As such, the Commonwealth cannot be subject to any Order of Court as a result of such a personal injury suit. Therefore, no right or interests of the Commonwealth would be affected by the outcome of any lawsuit against SEPTA in Pennsylvania courts. Consequently, personal injury lawsuits against SEPTA do not pose any danger that the Commonwealth itself would be involuntarily subject to and controlled by the mandates of the courts, without its consent, at the instance of private parties.

Based upon this analysis, the court in this Galette case found that the particulars of N.J. Transit’s status with respect to the State of New Jersey was similar. N.J. Transit was noted to be a distinct legal entity that is empowered to sue and to be sued in a capacity that is independent from the State of New Jersey.

The court found that there was no risk to the sovereign dignity to the State of New Jersey in permitting a suit against N.J. Transit to proceed. The court also noted that any potential judgment against N.J. Transit would have any discernable impact on the New Jersey Treasury.

Based upon this analysis, the court found that the Plaintiff’s personal injury lawsuit posed no threat either to the sovereign dignity or the State Treasury of New Jersey. As such, the court concluded that N.J. Transit was not an arm of the State of New Jersey in this context. 

Consequently, the court ruled that N.J. Transit was not entitled to protections of sovereign immunity which it had asserted. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of N.J. Transit’s Motion to Dismiss was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in this Galette case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Pennsylvania Civil Law Case Alerts,” Fastcase.com as provided by Pennsylvania Bar Association.

As such, the Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his Complaint.    

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia law office of the Reed Smith law firm.

However, the appellate court in this civil litigation confirmed that the results of the criminal trial did not answer the questions of causation or comparative fault in this personal injury matter.  Rather, those questions remained to be determined in this civil trial before a jury could consider whether or not to award damages. See Op. at 11-12.

In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided a detailed recitation of Pennsylvania precedent on the effect of collateral estoppel upon civil proceedings following a previous criminal conviction.

The court also addressed the issue of whether the concept of comparative negligence applies in cases where a Defendant has engaged in intentional or reckless conduct as was alleged in this matter.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that, “[a]lthough our Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, both this Court and our sister court, the Commonwealth court, have held that the Comparative and Negligence Act does not apply in a situation where a Plaintiff may be guilty of negligence, but a Defendant has acted recklessly.”  See Op. at 22 [citations omitted].

Here, the shooter argued that the Plaintiffs were wrong in arguing that the doctrine of comparative negligence should not have been applied. The shooter argued that there had never been any determination in any court that the conduct of the shooter was found to be “willful, wanton, or reckless.” 

The Superior Court noted that the plain language of the criminal statute pertaining to voluntary manslaughter did not contain any requirement of a finding that a person acted recklessly to be guilty of that crime.

The court went on to note that, even though the shooter may have acted intentionally, there still remained a question as to whether or not the shooter was justified in believing that his actions were in self-defense and, as such, potentially not reckless. 

The court confirmed that a person may have been found to have acted intentionally, but that does not necessarily mean that they also acted recklessly. 

As such, the Superior Court in this Rogers case found that the Plaintiffs were incorrect in asserting that intentional conduct necessarily covers reckless conduct.  See Op. at 23-24.

This decision is also notable in that the court found that the Plaintiffs had waived a number of issues by failing to follow the appellate rules establishing the procedures necessary to preserve issues for appeal.

In one instance, the court found that the Plaintiffs had waived their challenge to the trial court’s previous coordination order in which a Lackawanna County lawsuit was coordinated with a Susquehanna County lawsuit.  In this regard, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 311(c) allows a party in a civil action to take an interlocutory appeal as of right from an Order changing venue and/or transferring a case to another court of coordinated jurisdiction, or declining to proceed in the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court noted that a failure to lodge an interlocutory appeal in this scenario constitutes a waiver in any subsequent appeal of related challenges to decisions by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring Opinion by Judge Kunselman can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Gary Weber of the Williamsport, Pa law firm of Mitchell Gallagher, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

In the testimony at issue, the Plaintiff's medical expert stated during his testimony that jurors “can see” with their own eyes the Plaintiff’s injury in the medical imaging.  The court noted that the erroneous playback of this testimony, which was rephrased during the course of the videotaping after an objection was asserted by defense counsel, did not warrant a declaration of a mistrial where other admissible testimony made similar points.

The trial court noted that it had also issued a prompt curative instruction admonishing the jury to disregard the testimony at issue.

The court also found that, if there was an error, it was a harmless error.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 14, 2023).

 

In the case of Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, LLC, No. 2615 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. March 21, 2023 Bowes, J., King, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Superior Court addressed an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania in these consolidated appeals, that being whether a parent’s role as natural guardian entitles the parent to bind a minor child to an arbitration agreement and waive that child’s right to seek redress for injuries in a court of law.  

In the consolidated appeal, the Superior Court also addressed whether one spouse's signature on an waiver form could bind the other spouse to be limited to only pursuing a recovery at arbitration.

The appellate court affirmed the lower court rulings that answered this question in the negative and concluded that the claims presented were indeed permitted to head to a jury trial as opposed to arbitration.

Overall, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, after reviewing the law of agency and contract law, concluded that the trial courts had properly ruled that no agreements at issue served to bind the children or the non-signing spouses to resolve their negligence claims in arbitration rather than by way of a personal injury lawsuit in the courts.

More specifically, the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the trial court findings that the trampoline facility had failed to meet its burden to show that the signatory spouses were the agents of the non-signing spouses.

The court additionally held that the parent-child relationship did not empower the signatory parents to waive their minor children’s rights to have their claims resolved in a personal injury lawsuit in a court of law as opposed to arbitration.

As such, the lower court's Orders were affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Pennsylvania Civil Law Case Alerts,” Fastcase.com as provided by Pennsylvania Bar Association.

The tractor trailer Defendant argued that adjudicating this particular matter without all such Claimants joined in the same case would impair or impede or otherwise prejudice the ability of the absent parties to protect their interests. The Defendants also asserted that proceeding without the other Claimants being joined into this case would risk multiple, inconsistent duties to pay by the Defendant.

In denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the federal court reviewed Rule 19 which covers whether an absent party should be joined to existing litigation.

The court ruled that the Defendant’s claim of potential multiple exposures generated by the different claims and/or the Defendant’s potential inability to satisfy all of the resulting liabilities through the available insurance fails to raise concerns that fall within the scope of Rule 19.

The court also noted that, under the analysis required by Rule 19, there is nothing about the claims of the other alleged Claimants that impairs or impedes the ability to adjudicate the claims or defenses of the Plaintiff and the Defendant identified in this particular lawsuit.

The court went on to the note that the holding that a joinder is compulsory under Rule 19(a) is a necessary predicate to a district court’s discretionary determination under Rule 19(b) that the case must be dismissed because the joinder of the party is not feasible and the party is indispensable to the just resolution of the case.

Here, the court found that the tractor trailer Defendants had not established that any of the other Claimants is a required or necessary party to this particular lawsuit. As a result, none of the other Claimants were found to be an indispensable party. 

Accordingly, the court found no reason to grant the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. As such, the motion was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Dale G. Larrimore of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore & Farnish, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.

The court reasoned that whether and why a party did or did not participate in an underlying legal proceeding had no bearing on whether that party owed a duty of law or breached that duty relative to the underlying motor vehicle accident. The court also noted that the reference to any litigation strategy by the parties in the underlying case was inadmissible as it would likely confuse and distract the jury in this subsequent contribution action.

Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann M.D. Pa.

In this decision, the court also addressed issues regarding the qualifications and competency of a defense accident reconstruction expert to testify with regards to certain issues relevant to the accident. In his Opinion, Judge Brann set out the applicable law as to the admissibility of an expert witness as an expert in detail.  After reviewing that law, Judge Brann limited the Defendant's accident reconstruction expert’s testimony in certain respects.

The court also addressed whether or to the Defendant in this contribution action could attempt to introduce evidence that the settlement of the underlying personal injury case was allegedly influenced upwards by the fact that punitive damages claims were pled.

Judge Brann found that the Defendant in this contribution case had not developed any factual basis to support a claim that the punitive damages pled in the underlying case did serve to influence the settlement for which Cleveland Brothers was seeking a contribution in this matter.

The court also noted that an affirmative defense, such as the one at issue regarding the punitive damages issue, raised by a Defendant can be dismissed prior to trial for lack of proof. The court found that the Defendant’s proof in this regard was woefully insufficient and, as such, the Defendant was precluded from referencing at the trial of the contribution claims the fact that punitive damages may have been at issue in the underlying personal injury matter.

Relative to the actions of the Defendant truck driver, Judge Brann noted that, since the negligence of that driver was conceded, evidence of that driver’s conviction for traffic violations would be precluded as being more prejudicial then probative under an application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Judge Brann also addressed whether or not Cleveland Brothers could proceed with affidavits and/or testimony from the Plaintiff’s attorneys for the original Plaintiffs in the underlying litigation in the effort by Cleveland Brothers to establish that the damages paid in the underlying settlement were reasonable and necessary. 

The court analogized this evidence as being similar to office notes or reports by treating physicians. Judge Brann stated that, in the same way that treating physicians need not submit expert reports concerning their treatment in order to testify at trial, the attorneys for the original Plaintiffs in this same litigation would be permitted to testify as to the fairness of settlement without submitting expert reports under F.R.C.P. 26.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for summarizing this case in his monthly newsletter.  For full disclosure purposes, I note that I represented an Additional Defendant in this case.

As such, the Superior Court agreed that the trial evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the Defendant acted reasonably and waited until she thought it was safe to proceed and was, therefore, not negligent.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Fastcase Pennsylvania Civil Law Case Alerts Provided Through the Pennsylvania Bar Association” (Feb. 23, 2023).

In the case of Mattei v. Tuthill Corp., No. 3:19-CV-2196 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2023 Mannion, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case arising out of a skiing accident. 

As noted by Judge Malachy E. Mannion at the outset of his Opinion, this case raised questions as to the inherent risks of downhill skiing, the enforceability of releases on lift tickets, and the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged by the Plaintiff relative to the Defendant's alleged gross negligence and recklessness.

The gas tank supplier filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the joinder action based upon the subcontractor’s alleged spoliation of evidence in failing to preserve the subject gas tank.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon confirmed that, in determining whether a sanction is warranted for the spoliation of evidence, the court shoulder consider: 

(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; 

(2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and 

(3) the availability of a lesser sanction that will protect the opposing party’s rights and defer future similar conduct. 

The court noted that the first prong, which addresses the fault of the spoliating party, requires consideration of the offending party’s duty or responsibility to preserve the relevant evidence or lack of any such duty. 

Judge Nealon also noted that the destruction of potentially relevant evidence determines whether and what type of sanction should be imposed, not whether spoliation occurred.

Since the subcontractor’s vice-president testified that it was “more than likely” that the gas tank “was returned” to the supplier after the fire, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the subcontractor could be characterized as the spoliator of the gas tank. 

The court noted that the entry of summary judgment is the most extreme sanction for spoliation, and, at a minimum, requires proof that the party actually altered or destroyed the evidence, or authorized or directed its destruction or alteration. 

Judge Nealon ultimately ruled that, although the presiding trial judge would later determine whether an adverse inference instruction under Pa. SSJI (Civ) §5.60 (5th Ed.) is warranted under the circumstances presented, at this stage of the matter, the entry of summary judgment as a spoliation sanction was found to be inappropriate by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Phot by Brett Jordan on www.pexels.com.

According to the Opinion, the jury in the underlying matter had entered a verdict for over $5.5 million dollars against the Defendant on the personal injury claims presented.

In reviewing the Worker's Compensation Law, 77 Pa.C.S.A. Section 462, the Superior Court noted that general contractors take on secondary liability for the payment of worker's compensation for the employees of any subcontractors.  In the event a subcontractor defaults on securing worker's compensation coverage, then the coverage purchased by the general contractor would apply.  In this regard, the general contractor is considered under the law to be a statutory employer of the subcontractor's employee.

In exchange for this secondary liability taken on by a general contractor under the law, the general contractor is granted immunity from any tort liability arising out of the same incident.   

The court found that, given that the Plaintiff had received worker’s compensation benefits, the Plaintiff was judicially estopped from denying his employee status. The court noted that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff was an employee of the subcontractor at issue, and not an independent contractor.

As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a statutory employer status is not limited to general contractors at a job site.

The court additionally noted that worker’s compensation immunity, including with respect to the issue of whether or not a Defendant is a statutory employer, is a jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived.